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INTRODUCTION
E NVIRONMENTAL protection' involves trial and error. It is the
story of mistakes made and mistakes corrected. The system which
has evolved in the United States is neither perfect nor the result of a
master plan based on a rational scheme, scientific evidence or even eco-
nomic considerations. Indeed, our laws have often been the product of
hasty and accidental compromises in the aftermath of disaster.
The first task is to define a manageable scope for those problems which
can be dealt with effectively and efficiently under the heading "environ-
ment." There is a danger in over-broad definitions of the environment -
the feeling that nothing can be done at all because the problem is simply
too vast. Governments will always find it easier to do nothing than to
solve a problem with resolute action, so the ultimate danger of expansive
treatment of political questions as environmental protection is paralysis.
This paper will review problems dealing with water, air, noise and
toxic chemicals, beginning with constitutional problems affecting envi-
ronmental regulation and the reluctant recognition of the environment as
a priority subject for the federal government.2
1. Expressed in its broadest form, the birth, life and death of all living creatures
might be included in the phrase "environmental protection." There is a great but resist-
able temptation to bring nuclear power, energy policy, weapons production and "Star
Wars," overpopulation, ocean resources, national parks, industrial development and
waste disposal within its ambit.
2. This paper will not address the special problems involved in the national and
international regulation of nuclear energy, nor will it deal with the international relations
problems with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico, produced by salinated river water and
acid rain.
PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC AWARENESS
Public awareness of environmental concerns is essentially a product of
the past twenty-five years. Although the menace of oil pollution was rec-
ognized in the international arena in 1926 at the international conference
convened by President Coolidge in Washington,3 the draft convention on
the prevention of it was never ratified by any nation. Excessive use of the
pesticide DDT was publicly denounced by Rachel Carson4 in 1962. Her
book, Silent Spring, rapidly achieved best-seller status and reached a far
wider audience than the Sierra Club or the National Audubon Society
had ever been able to address on environmental issues.
An issue transcending the human environment and dealing with the
survival of all living creatures on Earth was also in the public conscious-
ness in 1962 - the subject of nuclear testing in the earth's atmosphere.
The crises of the Suez Canal and Hungary in 1956, and the Berlin Wall
and Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 and 1962, sensitized the public to the
dangers of nuclear war and intensified public intolerance of the "fall-out"
of radiation in the atmosphere from nuclear testing' by the United States,
United Kingdom, Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. When
the political will to take the first steps toward mutual trust was finally
present, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 6 was negotiated and mounting pub-
lic concern with the environment eased.7 With issues like these, the pro-
tection of the environment became a political force.
The United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal) con-
3. PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE ON OIL POLLUTION IN NAVIGABLE WATERS
(1926), T.S. No. 736-A. See also Interdepartmental Comm., Report to the Secretary of
State, Oil Pollution in Navigable Waters (1926).
4. Rachel L. Carson (1907-1964) began publication of Silent Spring in the New
Yorker on June 16, 1962. The book assumes that there was a time when all living crea-
tures lived in harmony with their surroundings, in relationships developed over
thousands of years. It postulates that the use of pesticides, especially DDT
(dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) destroyed that harmony, leading to sterility, mortality
and a "spring without voices." Silent Spring has been published in 16 countries. See P.
Brooks, The House of Life: Rachel Carson at Work (1972).
DDT was banned in this country in 1971. Unfortunately, new toxic chemicals are
continuously being developed by industry to meet increasing demands.
5. A historical review of the United States viewpoint of the background of the Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty may be found in A. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, 893-918
(1965); T. Sorensen, Kennedy, 617-24, 734-40 (1965). See Hearings on Executive M, The
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, G.P.O. Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1983). See also Dean, Negotiating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 273 (1964); Schwelb, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law, 58
AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1964); Schrag, Scientists and the Test Ban, 75 YALE L.J. 1340
(1964).
6. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, October 13, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
7. In thirteen years of above-ground testing (1945-1963 with moratoria), there were
336 nuclear (uranium and hydrogen) explosions. There were intermittent moratoria on
testing by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was
negotiated in Moscow in July-August, 1963 by the late Averell Harriman, Lord Hail-
sham and Andrei Gromyko. The Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and
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sidered problems of environmental protection for coastal zones in.its Sea-
bed Debates, which eventually produced resolutions$ leading to the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. This Coiference
produced The Declaration on the Human Environment, 9 which its au-
thors hoped would be regarded as a-basic document of international law
and policy in the tradition of The Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.10 The Stockholm Declaration is an exhortation to proper envi-
ronmental action, without the force of liability creating regulations.
However, the generally low level of budgetary support of the United Na-
tions Environmental Programme in Nairobi, Kenya," is a signal to pol-
icy-makers in government and industry that environmental protection
does not enjoy a high priority in international affairs. Mindful of this
international laxity, we shall turn our attention to the struggle for protec-
tion of the environment in the United States.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM
It has always been obvious that pollution does not respect state or na-
tional boundaries. However, in the United States, polluters have been
able to stop or slow proposed government actions for long periods of
time with the use of constitutional doctrines, alternatively arguing that
proposed state action violates federal power, while proposed federal ac-
tion violates states' rights.
opened for ratifications simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow on Septem-
ber 24, 1963.
President Kennedy made the following remarks when urging the Senate to give advice
and consent to the Treaty:
Since the advent of nuclear weapons all mankind has been struggling to escape
from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth .... Jyjesterday a
shaft of light cut into the darkness .... This treaty is not the millennium...
(blut it is an important first step .... This treaty is for all of us. It is particu-
larly for our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in
Washington. According to the ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey of a thou-
sand miles must begin with a single step." Let us take that first step.
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has been ratified by 114 nations as of January 1, 1986.
France, the People's Republic of China and Pakistan are among the nuclear power na-
tions not party to the Treaty.
. 8. G.A. Res. 2398, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2581, 24 U.N. OAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2657, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); and G.A.
Res. 2850, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 72, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
9. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. 1, Ch. I. See generally Report of the U.N. Conference
on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14
Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1972). Representatives of 114 nations at the Confer-
ence produced a Program of Environmental Action of some 200 points and the Declara-
tion on the Human Environment.
10. O.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. E/800, at 135 (1948).
11. G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
A new initiative in the protection of the environment appeared in Spring, 1987, with the
recognition by the World Bank of environmental concerns at the center of its planning
processes, rather than at the periphery.
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A. Sources of Federal Power
Under the federal constitution, there is no explicit duty of the federal
government to protect the environment against polluters. All federal
regulations affecting the environment must come from one of four
sources: the power to regulate commerce between the states;' 2 the power
to regulate the use of publicly owned lands;' 3 the power to enter into
treaties with foreign nations;' 4 and, the power to tax and spend.'" By far
the most important of these is the commerce power.
The leading modern case which demonstrates the broad reach avail-
able to Congress in environmental policy-making under the Commerce
Clause is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc. 6 In
Hodel, the surface coal mining industry challenged a Department of En-
ergy regulation' 7 that required operators engaged in strip mining to meet
rigorous performance standards.18 The coal industry argued that the De-
partment was regulating the use of privately owned land.' 9 Furthermore,
it contended that since land is "local," it is not "in commerce," and
therefore could not be regulated under the commerce clause. 20
The Supreme Court noted both the devastating effect of strip mining
on the environment,2' and that state efforts to control pollution of rivers
were difficult, if not impossible.22 The Court concluded that the com-
merce power protected not only the channels of commerce, but also
those "activities affecting commerce, ' 23 and therefore could be activated
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. United States Government public land currently
amounts to approximately 725 million acres. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States: 1988, 186 (108th ed.).
14. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
17. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 1201-1328
(1982).
18. "Included among those selected standards are requirements governing:
(a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its
approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil;(d) minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine
waste piles used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined areas; and (g) spoil
disposal. § 515(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1976 ed., Supp. III)." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 269
(citation omitted).
19. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 275.
20. Id.
21. The Court quoted congressional findings which stated in part that: "[Miany sur-
face mining operations ... (cause) erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods, by
polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty,
by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and property
by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counteracting governmental
programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural resources." Id. at 277
(quoting § 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1976 ed., Supp. III)).
22. Id. at 280.
23. Id. at 277 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
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when a certain activity combined with others to affect commerce among
the states.24 Because there was a rational basis for Congress to find that
strip-mining affects interstate commerce, the Department of Energy reg-
ulation was held by the Court to be a valid exercise of Congressional
authority. 25 The Court did not answer the narrow question framed by
the surface coal mining industry: whether land can be regarded as "in
commerce."
26
In Hodel, the Supreme Court also ruled on a claim that the Federal
regulation violated the tenth amendment to the Constitution. 27 Balanc-
ing federal and state interests in upholding the act, the Court concluded
that the federal regulation: 1) did not impose duties on state officials,
2) did not concern matters that were indisputably attributes of state sov-
ereignty, and, 3) did not impair, through compliance, the ability of the
state to govern itself as it wished in an area of traditional state function,
thus the statute is not in violation of the tenth amendment.28
B. State Power and Federal Preemption
An unfortunate corollary to federal power under the Commerce
Clause is the inability of states to prevent those forms of pollution which
are of particular local concern. The determining factor is federal pre-
emption, a concept whereby Congress, acting under its delegated pow-
ers, has occupied the field so completely that there is no room for any
state action.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,29 the Supreme Court considered the
24. Id. at 277 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
25. Id. at 281.
26. Id. at 275. Perhaps the Court followed the tradition, begun in 1937, that those
who challenge a federal regulation of business as violative of Due Process must prove the
regulation to be unconstitutional, rather than the Government having to show the act to
be constitutional. If, as here, the Court could discern ary rational basis for the regula-
tion, it would be regarded as beyond constitutional challenge. Cf. West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
27. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 283-85. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
28. Id. at 287-88. The three-part test which the Court derived from National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was later rejected in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Nevertheless, Hodel has not been
overruled, and its analysis remains good as restricted to the facts before the Court. De-
spite the victory in the Supreme Court, the original legislation, The Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977, was ineffective because it contained exemptions for
Appalachian mountain area residents to mine "house coal" in mines of two acres or less.
This exemption was widely abused by major coal mining companies in the Appalachian
mountain region, where large tracts were broken up into two-acre plots with small sec-
tions of unmined land between them. Finally, on April 24, 1987, Congress repealed the
exemption provision which the President had approved. After ten years of evading the
legislative intent, it may now be possible to restrain the environmental damage to the
nation caused by the strip-mining industry.
29. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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constitutionality of anti-pollution legislation of the State of Washington30
which imposed certain controls on oil tankers using the Puget Sound that
were stricter than those called for by Federal law or regulations.3
The Supreme Court rejected the controls as preempted by federal legis-
lation.32 The Court based its holding on: 1) an old federal statute regu-
lating the availability and qualifications of pilots, without mandating
their use;33 2) a 1972 statute giving the Secretary of Transportation the
power to establish design standards for vessels, which precluded states
from imposing any different design standards;34 and 3) the approval by
the Department of Transportation of the design standards for certain
tankers." The Court also noted that the design standards adopted by the
federal regulations resulted from an international agreement, and cited
this as the deciding factor in precluding the adoption of different state
standards.36
A more convoluted example of the federal preemption problem was
evinced by the Concorde/SST controversy. British Airways and Air
France had sought to compel the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey to permit operation of their super-sonic transport aircraft, the
Concorde, during a 16-month test period ordered by the Secretary of
Transportation. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, while there is
total federal preemption of control of flights through navigable airspace,
Congress had consciously given airport owners the responsibility of es-
tablishing permissible noise levels for the airport facility.3" Accordingly,
the Order of the Secretary of Transportation had not preempted the pow-
30. The State of Washington had acted in accordance with a 1973 decision by the
Supreme Court, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, in which a
Florida statute that imposed strict liability on vessels polluting state waters, at a time
when federal law required proof of fault, was upheld. The Florida statute was subse-
quently repealed by the State Legislature, although it had not been found to be
unconstitutional.
31. The State required that: 1) all ocean-going oil tankers of a certain weight carry a
state-licensed pilot while navigating Puget Sound, 2) those tankers not designed with
double bottoms and other protective devices had to be in ballast or use tugs to escort
them in the Sound, and 3) that very large (VLCC) and ultra-large (ULCC) tankers be
excluded from the Sound. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.170-88.16.190 (1988 Supp.).
32. Ray, 435 U.S. at 153-78.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 211-216 (1982) (originally enacted as The Coastal Licensing Act of
February 18, 1793, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305). See Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1
(1824).
34. 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1982) (originally enacted as The. Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1221-27 (1982).
36. 435 U.S. at 167-68. The agreement, not specified in the decision, is the Safety of
Life at Sea Conventions of the International Maritime Organization, June 17, 1960
(1965], 1 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27.
37. British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 431 F.
Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
38. British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York, 558 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir.
1977).
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ers of the owner-operator to regulate noise levels. Therefore, the Port
Authority's ban on Concorde take-offs and landings could not be over-
turned on its face.39 On remand, the District Court's evidentiary hearing
determined that the Port Authority's delays were unfair and discrimina-
tory, therefore a burden on interstate commerce. 4 The Port Authority
was unable to present persuasive evidence of irreparable harm to the en-
vironment; thus, it could no longer prevent the Concorde test flights by
refusing to test the aircraft in actual operations.41
Another turn in the complex relations of federal-state powers can be
seen in the recent case of California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
Co.42 The Federal Forest Service approved a plan by the Granite Rock
Company to quarry limestone from Mount Pico Blanco in the Big Sur
Region of Los Padres National Forest on the California Coast. The Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission attempted to enforce its permit requirements
(with environmental restrictions) on this mining activity.43 Granite
Rock requested declaratory judgment and an injunction against the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, on the ground that the state permit was pre-
empted by the Federal Mining Act of 1872." The Act allowed private
citizens to enter and explore federal land for minerals, and to perfect
claims on such mining sites. Preemption was also claimed under the
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act 45 and the Forest Service
Regulations."
The Supreme Court found no evidence that Congress intended to oc-
cupy the field or displace state environmental regulation, despite the ple-
39. Id. Nevertheless, the case was remanded for fact-finding on the issue of the rea-
sonableness of the Port Authority's delay in promulgating noise regulations of any kind
relating to the Concorde. Port Authority opposition to the Concorde test appeared to
comport with the political visions of the New York and New Jersey Governors (Carey
and Byrne), but the likelihood that the Concorde would be able to pass the standard jet
aircraft test of 112 PNdB (see n. 238 infra) created a suspicion that the Port Authority
was being unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory in its treatment of the Concorde, a
type of governmental action in another context known as "stonewalling."
40. British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 437 F.
Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
41. British Airways Board v. Port of New York, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977), modi-
fying 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The Second Circuit afirmed the injunction against the Port Authority's "unwarranted
official inaction" in refusing to set standards for S.S.T. test operations, noting: "If ever
there was a case in which a major technological advance was in imminent danger of being
studied into obsolescence, this is it." 564 F.2d at 1010. The District Court's injunction,
however, was modified so as to permit a new, uniform and reasonable noise standard.
Test landings and take-offs took place on Oct. 19 and 20, 1977, and since that time the
Concorde has been in regularly scheduled service between New York and London or
Paris.
42. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
43. California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30000 (West 1986). See § 30G00
for permit and § 30106 for developmental controls.
44. Ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872), 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1982).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464 (1982).
46. 36 C.F.R. 228.1-228.80 (1988).
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nary power over federal land provided in the Constitution.47 The Court
interpreted the Forest Service Regulations as devoid of preemptive in-
tent, and premised on the assumption of compliance with state environ-
mental protection laws.48
Thus it appears that state "environmental" regulations do not present
the type of actual conflict with federal law that would summarily defeat
them under the doctrine of Federal preemption.49
III. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW REMEDIES
A. Nuisance
In theory, the most effective remedy for pollution damage to private
citizens should be the common law cause of action, "nuisance. ' Realis-
tically, however, because the cause of action is dependent on enforcement
by individuals, even nuisance is inadequate to resolve pollution problems.
Such haphazard effort to deal with past conduct usually does not permit
effective supervision of future conduct, since administrative agencies and
not courts have the expert personnel required for effective monitoring
and control. Nuisance differs from a strict legal action in that the rem-
edy usually involves equitable relief (the injunction), and employs a bal-
ancing test in which the court weighs the social utility of a plaintiff's
injury against the defendant's actions. This normally arises when the
plaintiff establishes that his remedy at law for damages is inadequate and
seeks a permanent injunction against the defendant's conduct.5
1. Private Nuisance
Private nuisance is an interference by the defendant with the use and
enjoyment of the plaintiff's own land. 2 It does not require that the de-
fendant actually enter upon the plaintiff's land.
The weighing of the equities in a cause of action for private nuisance
will not always favor the environment. For example, in Boomer v. Atlan-
tic Cement Co.n" the defendant had built one of the largest and most
47. California Coastal, 480 U.S. at 580. See U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
48. 480 U.S. at 607-608. In his dissent, Justice Scalia saw the principal issue as not
environmental protection but land use control, "and the permit that [California] statute
requires Granite Rock to obtain is a land use control device. Its character as such is not
altered by the fact that the State may now be agreeable to issuing it so long as environ-
mental concerns are satisfied." As land use regulation, Justice Scalia finds that the states
have no independent land use authority over federal land because of exclusive federal
regulation.
49. Id. at 1439.
50. W. P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 616, 617
n.7 (5th ed. 1984). The word is derived from the Latin "nocumentum" by way of the
French word for "injure," and can be traced back to Sixteenth Century England.
51. Id. § 88A at 631.
52. Id. § 87 at 619.
53. 55 Misc.2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, aff'd, 30 A.D.2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452,
rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
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modem cement factories in the world at a cost of $45 million, and had
installed the most effective devices then available to control the dust and
noise created by the operation of its plant. The defendant was also the
largest taxpayer and employer in town, with over 300 workers at its
plant. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the factory's operation from contin-
uing to emit dirt, smoke and vibrations.54
The New York Court of Appeals refused to enter what it perceived as
the legislature's domain, stating, "the judicial establishment is neither
equipped... nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy
for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumfer-
ence of one private law suit."" Determining that the granting and en-
forcement of an injunction would be impractical, the court awarded
damages only for the permanent diminution of value of plaintiff's prop-
erty. 6 In effect, the court permitted the cement company to buy out the
plaintiffs cheaply, by placing a permanent servitude on their land.5'
The Boomer Court considered the general public interest against the
disruption of an existing concern of great importance to the community
and refused to order an injunction, even though the plaintiff was main-
taining a nuisance. Although the surrounding valley was continuously
filled with dust, the cost of abatement was regarded as too high and the
court left it to health and other public agencies to seek further relief in
the proper court.58
In contrast, when a taxpayer plaintiff showed special damages coupled
with zoning violations, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a private
nuisance claim and issued an injunction, preventing construction of an
asphalt plant and adjacent sand excavation pit.59 The court asserted that
the judicial accommodation evidenced in Boomer was inappropriate be--
cause the legislature had enacted a valid zoning ordinance.'o
54. 26 N.Y.2d at 222, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 312, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
55. Id. at 223, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314, 257 N.E.2d at 871. The New York Court of
Appeals did not follow its earlier precedent where it had granted an injunction against a
million dollar pulp mill to prevent pollution of a stream, irrespective of disparity in eco-
nomic consequence, because the defendant was doing substantial damage. Whalen v.
Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
56. Boomer, supra note 54, at 228, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319, 257 N.E.2d at 857.
57. Id.
58. The New York Court of Appeals noted that "techniques to eliminate dust and
other annoying by-products of cement making are unlikely to be developed by any re-
search the defendant can undertake within any short period, but will depend on the total
resources of the cement industry nationwide and throughout the world." Boomer, 26
N.Y.2d at 225-26, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317, 257 N.E.2d at 873. This stands in sharp contrast
to the procedure of the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907), in which the Court ultimately withheld its final judgment for some seventeen
years on a pollution controversy, pending research into possible methods of abatement.
59. Little Joe Realty, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 41 N.Y.2d 738, 395 N.Y.S.2d 428, 363
N.E.2d 1163 (1977). This apparent glimmer of environmental hope would never have
been litigated if the municipality had properly enforced its own zoning regulation.
60. Id. at 746, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 434, 363 N.E.2d at 1168.
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2. Public Nuisance
Where the activities of a defendant interfere with a community's right
to enjoy a reasonably healthy and social existence, its individual members
who have suffered damage different in kind and degree from the rest of
the community may bring an action in public nuisance.61 The activities
often involve minor violations of the criminal law, especially the codes
concerning public health, safety and morals.
In some states, only public officials can maintain a public nuisance
action.62 If the public official (normally the Attorney General) represent-
ing the public interest refuses to act, then the polluter can continue to
pollute with impunity. In other states private citizens are allowed to sue;
however, if a private citizen loses in a public nuisance action, whether
because it was a "friendly" suit or because it was inadequately prepared,
then the rights of all other members of the community can be foreclosed.
An unusual example of public nuisance is the case of Spur Industries,
Inc. v. Del Webb Development Co.63 The defendant operated a cattle
feedlot in what had traditionally been an agricultural area. In 1954, a
developer bought up farmland in the vicinity in order to build a retire-
ment community. Both parties expanded their facilities in the years
which followed until their two operations came to within 500 feet of each
other. Sales resistance to new homes in the community became substan-
tial because of the flies and odor caused by the 20-30,000 head of cattle in
the feedlot, which were producing about one million pounds of manure
per day."
Plaintiffs, developers and purchasers of retirement homes brought an
action for public nuisance, alleging that they had suffered damages differ-
ent in kind and degree from the rest of the relevant community.65 The
court held that the defendant had committed a public nuisance, declaring
that the developer had standing to sue and had shown special injury in
terms of lost sales.66 Although plaintiffs were therefore entitled to an
injunction against the feedlot's continued operation, the court ordered
the developer to indemnify defendant for the cost of closing the feedlot or
moving it to another location.67 The court based its decision on the fact
that since the plaintiff had brought many senior citizens to live in this
61. KEETON, supra note 50, § 90 at 646.
62. Id. § 90 at 643.
63. 108 ARIz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
64. Spur Industries, 108 Ariz. at 182, 494 P.2d at 704."
65. Id. at 183, 494 P.2d at 705. The court noted that if the residents of the commu-
nity had sued privately, they would, at most, have been entitled to damages. Id. at 184,
494 P.2d at 706.. If the developer-plaintiff had pursued his claim in private nuisance,
there may have been no cause of action at all, because of the "coming to the nuisance"
defense. Id. at 184-85, 494 P.2d at 706-07.
66. Id. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706.
67. Id. at 186, 494 P.2d at 708. See also Lewin, Compensated Injunction on the Evolu-
tion of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775 (1986).
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"'nuisance," equity demanded that he also do equity.6" This case demon-
strates the unexpected problems faced by the "successful" plaintiff in
nuisance.
Nuisance law has developed through the common law without consid-
eration of the best possible solutions for a rational protection of the envi-
ronment. Decisions like Boomer and Del Webb demonstrate the
unpredictability and, in essence, the inadequacy of the nuisance cause of
action as a remedy to ongoing pollution.
3. Common Law Nuisance and Federal Preemption
The Supreme Court had previously recognized a federal common law
of nuisance in areas of national concern, such as ambient or interstate
water and air.69 However, in 1981 the Court held, at least insofar as
water pollution is concerned, that Congress had substituted a statutory
scheme of regulation, thereby eliminating the federal common law of nui-
sance.70 Later that same year, the Court indicated that Congress might
have completely preempted any cause of action under state laws of nui-
sance where the Clean Water Act applied.7'
The Clean Water Act provides that nothing therein "shall restrict any
right which any person... may have under any statute or common law
to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief ... ."72 Recently, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the
Supreme Court held that this provision preempts the application of the
common law of the state being affected by pollutants emanating from
within the territory of another state.73
Nevertheless, the Clean Water Act was held to preserve the right to
bring a nuisance claim under the law of the source state, which presuma-
bly had received permission for its polluting use of the water under EPA
licensing requirements. 4 The Court noted that the application of "vague
and indeterminate" common law rules of affected states could seriously
interfere with the implementation of the Act.7 5
68. Spur Industries, 108 ARIz. at 186, 494 P.2d at 708.
69. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee I). In Illinois, the Court stated that federal
environmental regulations might in time preempt the federal common law of nuisance,
but until such time federal courts were free to appraise the equities based on all applicable
federal laws. 406 U.S. at 107.
70. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (Milwaukee II). The Court
held that the Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1982)) (Clean Water
Act), preempted federal common law.
71. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clanmers Assn., 453
U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 505(e) (1982).
73. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1987).
74. Id. at 497-99.
75. Id. at 496. In this case, as in Boomer, the source state was New York. Although
the affected Vermont landowners in Ouellette may have retained a New York state law
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B. Strict Trespass
The medieval writ of Trespass Quare Clausum Fregit (breaking the
close), or strict trespass, is still available in some East Coast states for use
in certain pollution situations. It does not require proof of fault, but
merely unauthorized and unprivileged entry onto a plaintiff's land.
Proof of actual damages is not required.76
C. Common Law Negligence
Where defendant's negligent polluting actions cause personal injury,
death, or property damage, those actual losses may be recovered in state
or federal courts. Proof of fault rather than strict liability is still re-
quired."' A full argument on these different standards of liability took
place before the House of Lords in 1956.78
While a general shift in the burden of proof in pollution cases at com-
mon law, from the victim to the polluter under a strict liability theory,
does not appear likely in the near future, it appears that narrow questions
of strict liability are likely to recur as a result of legislative activity.79
Societal concern enforcing polluter responsibility, where cheap and ad-
equate precautions to avoid oil spills have not been taken, will advance
the doctrine of common law negligence in the direction of a strict or
cause of action, there remains considerable doubt as to the availability of the traditional
remedy by injunction due to the value of the pulp mill, the number of employees involved
and the importance of the pulp mill to the economy. This is so despite the assumption of
the dissenters that New York law and Vermont law were the same. Id. at 509.
76. Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co., (267 F.) 460, 463 (D.R.I. 1920). See also Da-
vis v. Georgia Pacific Corp. 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968).
77. The traditional elements of negligence are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) cause and
(4) harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). Historically, the intro-
duction of new means of transport (particularly automobiles and aircraft) led the courts
to impose strict liability. As these new means became more common, the liability regime
shifted to negligence. Many years would pass before a return to strict liability under a
no-fault insurance scheme would become popular.
78. Esso Petroleum, Ltd. v. Southport Corp., 1956 A. C. 218. The pollution of the
River Ribble, near Liverpool, had been caused by the grounding of a tanker. The master
jettisoned 400 tons of fuel oil to lighten the vessel. The fuel oil was carried by wind and
tide onto plaintiff's beach causing damage. Plaintiff's suit was based on common law
trespass, nuisance and negligence, alleging improper navigation and unnecessary jettison
of fuel. The lower court found trespass and nuisance to be inapplicable and the case
proceeded on the negligence count, but the court found that the master had not been
negligent in jettisoning fuel in the circumstances. The House of Lords required evidence
of negligence and rejected strict liability without proof of fault. Id.
Lord Devlin suggested the possibility of an action based on the Admiralty doctrine of
unseaworthiness, a non-fault remedy in insurance, crew desertion and personal injury
cases, if plaintiffs had pleaded and proved the source of the accident to be a defective
steering gear.
79. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see infra note 151; Resources Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, infra note 256; Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability Act, see infra note 270; see also Ports and Waterways Safety
Program Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972) (renumbered and amended Pub. L. No.
95-474, 92 Stat. 1471, 33 U.S.C. § 1221-1236 (1978). Cf Maryland v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
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enterprise liability."0 In recent years, however, few environmental cases
have been brought based on common law negligence because of the diffi-
culties of proof and the possible preemption of the common law remedy
under various federal statutory schemes.
IV. FEDERAL STATUTORY POLICIES
A. The National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196981 (NEPA) fixes the
high priority to be assigned to environmental questions whenever the fed-
eral government proposes any action which affects the human environ-
ment. It should be noted that this policy statement followed, rather than
preceded, such important statutory controls as the Clean Air Act of
196382 and the various oil pollution acts. 3 No new substantive rights are
created by NEPA. Rather, the Act contains specific guidelines and pro-
cedures for Federal agencies to consider when planning any action which
may have environmental consequences.8 4 NEPA deals only with the
Federal government and not the states.8 5 It makes environmental pro-
tection an important priority of the United States Government, although
80. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller S.S. Co., 1967 A. C. 617 (Wagon
Mound II). Cf. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r. Co., 1961 A. C.
388 (Wagon Mound I). The House of Lords, sitting as the Privy Council's Judicial Com-
mittee, gave further consideration to problems of oil pollution in two famous decisions
dealing with an oil spill and fire in the harbor of Sydney, Australia. The vessel Wagon
Mound was discharging fuel in a careless manner, resulting in a spill which spread to a
ship repair facility and a neighboring moored vessel. The oil was set on fire by contact
with hot metal from welding operations at the ship repair facility. In Wagon Mound I
the Judicial Committee found that the polluter was liable for pollution damage to the
dock owner. The polluter was not liable for the fire damage because it was not considered
to be foreseeable harm. Wagon Mound II was brought by the damaged vessel owner
using a new factual finding to support a negligence claim. The Judicial Committee con-
sidered the effect on foreseeability of the failure of defendant to take adequate and cheap
precautions to avoid the potential damage from the oil spill where there could be no
social utility (cost/benefit analysis) in the absence of precautions.
81. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1982). The
heart of the statute is section 4332(2)(c), which states in part: "(2) all agencies of the
federal government shall... (c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on - (i) the environ-
mental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed
action, (iv) the relationship between local short term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented."
82. Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
83. Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (repealed April 3, 1970); Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982).
84. See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). See City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir.,
1972).
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no greater than other major policies. s6
1. The Environmental Impact Statement
To effectuate the policies of NEPA, the statute makes use of Environ-
mental Impact Statements (EIS). 7 EIS are required for all proposals for
legislation and other major federal actions which may "significantly [af-
fect] the quality of the human environment." 8 Nevertheless, the EIS
requirement does not apply to the annually submitted budget requests of
government agencies."
The Supreme Court has assumed that the courts would have to enforce
the submission of an EIS.90 A frequent issue for the courts is the scope
and content of an EIS, as well as the time at which it must be prepared. 9'
Although very few projects have been stopped by a defective EIS, the
delays have been considerable. Thus, the EIS, under NEPA, has become
an additional weapon for lawyers in negotiating the development of a
project where federal funds are required.92
86. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b) (1982). NEPA's stated goals are to:
"(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and esthetically and culturally
pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation,
risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage,
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of
individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable
recycling of depletable resources."
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(c) (1982).
EIS must include:
(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action;
(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented;
(c) Alternatives to the proposed action;
(d) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the main-
tenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(e) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Id.
See also 40 C.F.R. 1502.14 for further refinements. An example of an inadequate EIS
as to alternatives is discussed in Chelsea Neighborhood Assoc. v. United States Postal
Service, 516 F.2d 378 (2d.Cir. 1975). See generally, Friedman, Operational Impact of
NEPA and Related Environmental Laws, Regulations and Orders on Mineral Operations,
19 RoCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 47 (1974), and Friedman, Recent NEPA Effects on
Industrial Development, 9 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 479 (1976).
89. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
90. In so doing, the Supreme Court has tacitly accepted the holding of the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
91. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
92. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519. However, the holding in Kleppe limits the use of
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2. The Presidential Council on Environmental Quality
The Presidential Council on Environmental Quality93 (CEQ), created
by President Carter under NEPA in 1977, establishes regulations for all
government departments to observe when responding to the require-
ments of the Act. CEQ's maximum effectiveness as a government organ
came shortly after its creation, when it laid down rules to determine
agency responsibilities under NEPA.94
3. President Reagan's Executive Order
In 1981, President Reagan signed an Executive Order" under which
agencies are to take only those actions which result in a net benefit to
society, by choosing methods having the least net cost and by taking into
account the condition of the particular industry affected. Thus, cost-ben-
efit analysis became enshrined at the heart of environmental protection
policy in the United States. Behind the theory was the view of President
Reagan and his advisers that environmental protection had placed exces-
sive burdens on business, especially financial burdens which hurt the ex-
isting economy, and placed obstacles in the way of rapid development of
land and mineral resources which impeded economic growth potential.
However, the President's great popular appeal could not be translated
into a legislative mandate to reduce environmental protection legislation
affecting industry, in the face of staunch opposition by environmental
organizations and their allies in Congress.96 Although the Administra-
tion has been able to stall consideration of legal and policy solutions to
the domestic and international acid rain problem, President Reagan's
veto of legislation reviving the Clean Water Act was over-ridden by sub-
stantial bi-partisan majorities.97 The current political stalemate in Con-
gress will probably mean the end of the Reagan environmental program.
Thus, the 1981 Executive Order may be the most significant environmen-
tal development in the Reagan years.
injunctions in EIS litigation to situations in which there is, in fact, harm. See 427 U.S. at
.401-02.
93. Council on Environmental Quality, 42 U.S.C. § 4341-47 (1982).
94. 40 C.F.R. 1500-1517.7 (1988). C.E.Q. will mediate conflicts between federal
agencies as to which will be the "lead agency" in preparing an EIS. 40 C.F.R. 1501.7(b)
and 1501.5.
95. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at
431-34 (1982).
96. Such organizations as The Wilderness Society, The World Wildlife Fund, The
Conservation Foundation, The Environmental Defense Fund, The Natural Resources
Defense Council, The National Wildlife Federation, The National Audubon Society, The
Friends of Earth, Inc., and The Sierra Club, opposed the President's Order.
97. See infra note 184. Congress overrode the presidential veto with a vote of 86-14
in the Senate, 133 CONG. REC. S. 1708 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) and a vote of 401 to 26 in
the House, 133 CONG. REC. H. 525-26 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987).
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4. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency
In 1970, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency9" (EPA) was
created by an Executive Order of President Nixon for general adminis-
tration of environmental concerns undertaken by the federal government.
An example of the work of the EPA can be seen in the Clean Air Act of
1977.99 The Act requires the EPA administrator to determine "national
ambient air quality standards '""°° for various air-borne pollutants, such
as nitrogen dioxide. Primary' 0 1 (i.e. those which protect public health)
and secondary'0 2 (i.e. those which protect public welfare) standards are
to be established. The primary standards are to be attained "as expedi-
tiously as possible,"'0 3 while the secondary standards are to be attained
within a "reasonable time.""' 4
By 1986, the EPA had acquired the same power over federal agencies
which it already had over private citizens and industry regarding hazard-
ous waste disposal. This power to compel compliance was resisted in
1987 by the Justice Department under the theory that one executive
agency may not sue another, and that such inter-agency disputes should
be resolved by the Office of Management and Budget. Congress seems
unlikely to adopt these views.
After a series of scandals0" in the 1981-1983 period under officials
who were, at best, hostile to the work of the Agency, the EPA has been
brought back to the point of original effectiveness. "6 Briefly, the EPA is
again enforcing the law. During the 1981-83 period virtually no legal
actions against environmental polluters were filed. The Agency is now
proceeding with enforcement of well-established environmental criteria,
and it now appears that the EPA itself will be proposing new Federal
98. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2,086. As of July 1, 1987
the EPA has published eleven volumes of regulations in 40 C.F.R., weighing 21 pounds
5.5 oz. in paperback.
99. Clean Air Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).1102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. During the past six years, resignations were forced or volunteered in the wake of
various investigations into EPA operations, including the resignations of the former EPA
Administrator, Mrs. Anne Burford; the Acting EPA Administrator, Mr. John W. Her-
nandez; the EPA Inspector General, Mr. Matthew Novick; the EPA General Counsel,
Mr. Robert Perry; and three Assistant EPA Administrators.: Mr. John Horton, Mr. John
Todhunter and Ms. Rita Lavelle. Ms. Lavelle, Asst. Administrator for Toxic Wastes has
been convicted of perjury in connection with an investigation of preferential treatment of
industrial polluters.
106. William Ruckelshaus was appointed EPA Administrator by President Nixon in
1970 and was reappointed by President Reagan to the Agency in 1983. Mr. Ruckelshaus
apparently succeeded in restoring morale and discipline to the Agency before his re-re-
tirement in 1985, and was succeeded by Lee M. Thomas, a career government official
with eighteen years experience in his home state (South Carolina) and Federal
government.
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action to protect the underground aquifers that supply about half the
drinking water, and much of the water used to irrigate crops, in the
.United States. The proposal of new forms of Federal action will be a new
experience for the Agency, but one that is long overdue.
V. COMPLAINTS OF POLLUTION
One hundred and fifty years ago an observer of the American scene
recognized a trait of Americans which separates them very clearly from
Continental Europeans: Americans are very litigious, with the result
that almost every political dispute can become a legal dispute. 07 In light
of this tradition, pollution-related complaints can be brought into the
courts by private citizens 0" and public interest groups,"°9 as well as the
Federal and State governments. In addition to judicial proceedings
against polluters, actions may be brought against government agencies to
force them to act against polluters."' Such actions are especially appro-
priate in instances where deadlines established by Congress have not
been met."'
A. The Costs of Environmental Litigation
Litigants generally must pay for the services of their own lawyers. The
winning party is not entitled to attorneys' fees unless a statute specifically
authorizes it, " 2 which is very unusual. " I Polluters often consider litiga-
tion expenses part of the cost of doing business, but such expenses are
usually beyond the means of private citizens. As a result, public interest
groups which have the resources to pay expensive legal fees are fre-
quently the plaintiffs in such cases.
B. Standing
Do public interest groups have the right to challenge environmental
pollution where there is no direct injury to the property of such a group?
107. A. DeToqueville, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (ed. 1840). "The influence of
legal habits extends beyond the precise limits I have pointed out. Scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question. Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in their controversies, the ideas, and
even the language peculiar to judicial proceedings." Id.
108. See Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) (not an environmental case); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
109. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); See also Save
The Bay, Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
111. Id.
112. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
113. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304d as added 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d)
(1982) (recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 505d,
as added 86 Stat. 888, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
2601-2629 (1982) §§ 20-21; see generally Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260.
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In Sierra Club v. Morton," 4 the Supreme Court said they did not. Walt
Disney Enterprises had planned to build a large resort community in the
Sequoia National Forest. The U.S. Forest Service had approved the pro-
ject. "' 5 The Sierra Club, a public interest group of great influence,
brought an action under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act "' 6 to force the Forest Service to disapprove the plan.
The Supreme Court said that in order to challenge an agency's action,
a plaintiff must show injury in fact to the party seeking review," 7 and
that the interest to which plaintiff claims injury is within the zone of
interests being regulated or protected by that governmental agency.'"
The Sierra Club lacked standing because it had specifically avoided
pleading injury to individual members, relying on its longstanding and
well-known interest in environmental issues." 9
Although the Sierra Club lacked standing to sue under its original alle-
gations, the Court suggested, in dictum, that individual members of the
Sierra Club who could no longer hike through beautiful mountain wil-
derness would suffer injury when agency action caused the loss of this
opportunity. 20 These members, and the Sierra Club on their behalf,
would meet the standing requirements to challenge the Service's ap-
proval of development plans.' 2' In the next year the Supreme Court put
the dictum into action by permitting a suit by a group organized for the
specific purpose of challenging a government action which would dis-
criminate against the use of recycled products, particularly soft drink
containers. 
22
Mere standing, however, will not forecast the outcome of a case. In
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 23 plaintiff-envi-
114. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
115. Id. at 729.
116. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1982)).
117. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
118. Id. at 733 (citing Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970)).
119. 405 U.S. at 740.
120. Id. at 735. The Court had previously held that injury need not be economic to be
"in fact," thereby giving standing to the injured party. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at
154 and cases cited therein.
121. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
122. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973) (challenging a schedule of rail freight rate increases by the Interstate
Commerce Commission).
123. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Supreme Court permitted the plaintiffs to challenge the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1982)), which contains a monetary limit on the liability of nuclear power plant opera-
tors. The plaintiffs argued that they might suffer environmental injuries in the future as a
result of the construction of nuclear power plants, which would not have been built but
for the limited liability of plant operators. Plaintiffs additionally argued that if there were
a nuclear disaster, such a limitation of the plant operators' liability would be akin to
appropriation of their property without just compensation, in violation of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the
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ronmentalists could challenge the monetary limitation 124 on nuclear
power plant liability but the Court rejected on the merits the notion that
the fifth amendment forbids limitations of liability as a taking of property
without just compensation.121
Limitation on the rights of public interest groups to sue can be seen in
California v. Sierra Club,126 where the Sierra Club was seeking to estab-
lish a private cause of action to enforce prohibitions in Section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899127 dealing with obstructions to naviga-
tion. That statute does not explicitly create any private enforcement
mechanism, but the Sierra Club argued that a private enforcement action
is implied by necessity from the legislation. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, found that the statute was intended to benefit the public at large
and not any specific individual or group;' 28 thus, there was no evidence
of Congressional intent to create a private remedy. 129
C. Scope of Judicial Review of Environmental Questions
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that there is a very wide
scope of judicial review for environmental matters, there are built-in lim-
itations to the courts' power to rule on certain environmental issues
where Congress has forbade review, directly or indirectly, through broad
grants of discretion. Illustrative of this type of case is Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe. "o
In Overton, Federal statutes provided that highways were not to be
built through public parks where a "feasible and prudent" alternative
route existed.'' These statutes also required "all possible planning to
minimize harm" before approval of highway construction through a pro-
tected area. 132 The Secretary of Transportation had approved the use of
Federal highway funds to build an interstate highway through a 342-acre
city park in Memphis, Tennessee. A citizen environmental group sued in
order to preserve the city park. 13' The Government claimed that the
statute was a deprivation of property in the sense of a "taking" for fifth amendment
purposes. Id. at 85-88.
124. Price-Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). The monetary limita-
tion on damages was $560,000,000 in 1978 and remains at that level in 1988, despite
proposals for its increase.
125. 438 U.S. at 74-75.
126. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
127. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
128. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 292-98. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), for a
further discussion of judicial review of administrative actions for rule-making.
129. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294.
130. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
131. Id. at 404-5.
132. Id. at 405.
133. Id. at 406. Standing was attained through proof of injury in fact to a protected
interest of the party seeking review, Id. at 410, under the tests which the Court would
later endorse in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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Secretary's approval was discretionary activity which could not be re-
viewed by the courts. 134 The Supreme Court noted that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act presumes judicial review of agency actions except
within narrow exemptions for action committed to agency discretion. 35
Discretion must be granted "in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply."' 136
The Supreme Court noted that there was no indication that Congress
sought to prohibit review under these statutes, and held that the words
"feasible and prudent" in the statute provide criteria rather than discre-
tion, and that actions taken thereunder can be reviewed by the courts. 1 37
Although the Secretary's actions were subject to judicial review, the
standard of that review was limited. Outside certain narrow excep-
134. Overton, 401 U.S. at 411. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). See generally Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 498 (1951); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197 (1938).
135. Overton, 401 U.S. at 410, quoting S.REP. No. 752, 79th Cong. 1st Sess., 26 (1945)
(report on the Administrative Procedure Act). See 401 U.S. at 413 for the standard of
review, as follows:
"[F]or that we must look to § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1964 ed., Supp. V), which provides that a 'reviewing court shall
... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found'
not to meet six separate standards.'
30 To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing pro-
vided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964 ed. Supp. V)..
401 U.S. at 413-14.
136. Overton, 401 U.S. at 410.
137. Id. at 409-13. "No feasible and prudent alternative" is a "clear and specific"
directive. The Agency was not adjudicating a dispute, such as the grant of a license or
the imposition of a sanction, nor making a change in the nature of the conduct required.
Thus, the standard for review of the administrative action was not whether the action was
"unsupported by substantial evidence," nor whether "unwarranted by the facts," but that
the actual choice was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. " Id. at 416.
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tions, 131 the standard applied to the review of an agency action is that the
action must not have been "arbitrary and capricious" on the basis of the
whole record. Overton also seems to establish that the decision not to
prepare an EIS is reviewable. 139
VI. PRESENT STATUTORY SCHEME OF FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. Water
1. The Refuse Act
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 189914 (The Refuse Act) was origi-
nally intended to prevent obstruction of navigable waters in interstate
commerce. 14 1 The statute has been incorporated into subsequent legisla-
tion, 142 and the Supreme Court has interpreted it as protecting the water-
138. Id. at 410-414. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
139. Overton, 401 U.S. 410-11. One of the most controversial decisions on the scope of
review is the snail darter case which brought the courts into disrepute and ridicule be-
cause of the apparent waste of resources. In Hill v. T.V.A., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.
1977), the Court of Appeals issued an injunction against the completion of construction
of a new hydro-electric dam (The Tellico Dam) in the Little Tennessee Valley because the
dam would threaten an endangered species of fish, the snail darter. The project had
previously been halted for more than a year and a half by a preliminary injunction in an
independent action, alleging failure by T.V.A. to comply with the requirements of
NEPA. See Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.Tenn. 1972),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). The district court ultimately concluded that the
requirements had been met and allowed the project to continue. See Environmental De-
fense Fund v. T.V.A., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.
1974).
Most of the dam had already been completed, at considerable cost, but in T.V.A. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Supreme Court found that Congress had determined that
higher priority be given to endangered species, so that the injunction must follow despite
the enormous cost of the uncompleted dam. The backlash effect was compounded by
revelations that scientists were in error concerning the extinction of the snail darter,
which was thriving in other habitats. After the Supreme Court decision Congress en-
acted a law to permit the dam to be built, in 1979. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). See Sec. 7 of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, 886 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)). Under this statute, 425 species have been
"listed" as threatened or endangered and entitled to protection.
140. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1152, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982). Section 13 of the Act states: "It
shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be
thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any
kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the
United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water .... "
141. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226-30 (1966); United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 489-91 (1960); see generally Kashiwa, The Refuse
Act and Protection of Water Quality, 9 Hous. L. REv. 676 (1972). The Fifth Circuit has
found that the government's remedy under the Refuse Act is precluded by the FWPCA,
United States v. Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132
(1983).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
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ways from pollution by forbidding the discharge of refuse matter or
industrial waste into navigable waters.1 43
2. Oil Pollution Act of 1924
The Oil Pollution Act" was enacted because of the first international
pollution conference; the same conference that had produced the 1926
unratified convention. 145 However, this statute was ineffective because of
the failure to prepare administrative regulations.I"
There was no other federal statute on water pollution until 1948. A
major mistake in the attempt to protect the coastal zones from oil pollu-
tion occurred in 1966, when the 1924 statute was amended to replace the
government's simple burden of proof (that there had been a discharge)
with a new requirement of gross negligence or willful spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting or emptying of oil.' 4 '
3. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948
The Water Pollution Control Act 48 is directed only at pollution of
interstate waters which endanger the health or welfare of persons in a
state other than that in which the discharge originates.
4. Water Quality Act of 1965
The Water Quality Act of 1965" 9 required states to adopt water qual-
ity standards for interstate waters within their borders. These standards
had to be approved by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
If this approval was not given, an elaborate procedure was necessary to
enforce revisions. 50 Even with approved standards in place, however,
little guidance was available to determine levels of discharge to be pro-
143. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
144. Ch. 315, 43 Stat. 604, 33 U.S.C. § 431, repealed by Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-224, Title I, § 108, 84 Stat. 113.
145. See supra note 3. The Oil Pollution Act was also a response to United States v.
Crouch, an unreported Circuit Court of Appeals case in 1922, holding that Sec. 13 of the
Refuse Act was inapplicable to polluting deposits which did not obstruct navigation. See
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229, note 5 (1966).
146. S. REP. No. 66, 68th Cong., 1st Sess; H.R. REP. No. 794, 68th Cong., 1st Sess; see
also Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 229 n.5. See C. Lettow, The Control of Marine Pollution in
Federal Environmental Law, 596, 602 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
147. The Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. § 3432 (3) (Supp. 1967).
Act of Nov. 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, tit. II, § 211 (a), 80 Stat. 1246, 1252-53. This
misconceived statute was cynically labelled Clean Waters Restoration, but was repealed
in 1968.
148. Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, 1155-56 (1948), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1371 (1982).
149. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903, 908 (1965) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982).
150. Water Quality Act, § 6, 79 Stat. 903, 905-906 (1965). See generally R. Zener, The
Federal Law of Water Pollution Control in Federal Environmental Law, 682, 715-19 (E.
Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); J. Quarles, Jr. (EPA General Counsel), Address before
the American Bar Ass'n National Institute, October 26, 1972, 3 Environment Reporter,
Current Developments 794 (Nov. 1972).
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hibited, or the responsibilities of industrial dischargers to modify their
practices.
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Acts (FWPCA) of 1972 and 1977
The intent of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was to establish
a comprehensive plan to clean up oil pollution with a liability scheme
attached. 5 ' Liability under FWPCA is imposed, without proof of fault,
for the cost of removing an oil spill. Only four defenses are available: act
of God; act of war; negligent act of the U.S. government; and acts (or
omissions) of third parties. 152 This liability is limited, however, to $150
per ton of the vessel's gross tonnage up to a maximum amount of
$14,000,000. Evidence of financial responsibility to meet liabilities under
FWPCA must be established by vessel operators (over 300 gross tons)
using any port or navigable waters of the United States. 1 53 Proof of will-
ful negligence or willful misconduct within the privity or knowledge of
the owner will result in unlimited liability. 54 This legislation was not
intended to deal with private claimants, but only with the United States
Government's claims for cleanup of oil spills.' 55 Special legislation has
151. Pub. L. No. 92-500 86 Stat. 816 (1972), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, amended by the
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L.. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1582. A 1970 statute, The
Water Quality Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), had introduced
the concept of the government's special cleanup cost recovery. This 1970 statute was
amended and reenacted as The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, which has
been described as a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution.
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975). The statute authorized appropriation
for a $35 million revolving fund for cleanup. Destruction of polluting vessels was author-
ized. 86 Stat. 816, 865-69. A National Contingency Plan for removal of oil spills was to
be established. This plan is now memorialized in the National Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.
152. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, 867 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982)). See generally, Healy
and Paulsen, Marine Oil Pollution and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 1 J.
MAR. L. & COMM. 537 (1970).
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1982).
154. Id. See Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1164 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979). The Second Circuit here defined the statutory
phrase "willful misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner," not else-
where defined, in terms similar to those already applied to the treaty term "willful mis-
conduct" in the 1929 Warsaw Convention. Id. at 1162-63. Tug Ocean Prince denied
limitation on the entire record. Id. at 1163. See also Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied
Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 614 (4th Cir. 1979) where limitation was granted under
FWPCA, although denied under the 1851 "global" Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 183(a) (1982).
155. Costs reimbursable to the government are the actual cleanup expenses by the U.S.
Coast Guard. See United States v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D.
Tex. 1981).
While this United States legislation was affected by international developments, it
should be noted that the United States is not a party to either of the international conven-
tions on oil pollution liability, or their protocols, despite efforts of the Department of
Transportation to achieve ratification in recent years. Earlier opposition centered on the
low level of recoveries. The international scheme was prepared in the period 1969-1971
following the disastrous Torrey Canyon oil spill of March, 1967. See, Sweeney, Oil Pollu-
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also been enacted to deal with the Trans Alaska Pipeline 56 as well as
Deepwater Ports. 57
The inclusion of the phrase "water quality standards" in 1965 evinced
Congress' implicit acceptance of the idea that use of water for waste dis-
posal was acceptable. The 1972 amendments, however, rejected this doc-
trine on the ground that no one should expect to be able to pollute.15 8
An additional major change in 1972 was the extension of the Act's cover-
age from "interstate waters," or the historical definition of "navigable
waters of the United States," to simply "waters of the United States.' 5 9
The Federal Clean Water Act of 1977' ° amended and reenacted the
tion of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 155 (1968), and Sweeney, Environmental Pro-
tection by Coastal States: The Paradigm from Marine Transport of Petroleum, 4 GA. J.
INT'L. & COMP. L. 278 (1974).
The present international scheme to compensate private owners for damages to their
property caused by an oil spill and to compensate governments for clean up expenses
involves two tiers of liability: the owners of the transport service (the shipowner) and the
cargo owner. The 1969 IMCO Convention on Civil Liability, entered into force on May
6, 1975, is based on fault, with a "reverse" burden of proof: that is, the vessel owner must
establish non-fault. Defenses are: act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natu-
ral phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character; intentional act of
a third party or the negligence or wrongful act of "any Government or other authority
responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids ...." See Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 45, 47-48 (Nov. 29, 1969). Liability is limited, however, to 2000 gold (Poincare)
francs per ton of net limitation tonnage ($134 U.S. as of 1969) with a maximum limit on
recovery of 210,000,000 ($14,000,000 U.S. as of 1969). Id.
Opposition to this Convention by the United States and other coastal states led to the
1971 Fund Convention, whereby pollution damages in excess of those covered by the
1969 IMCO Civil Liability Convention, with a maximum recovery of 450,000,000
($30,000,000 U.S. as of 1971), can be secured from the Fund if the pollution damage
resulted from an incident involving one or more ships. Defenses are an act of war, hostil-
ities, civil war or insurrection. Warships and other non-commercial government vessels
are not covered. See International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, (Dec. 18, 1971) 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 284, 286-87 (1972).
Both Conventions were amended in 1976 to change the unit of account from gold
francs to the Special Drawing Right (S.D.R.) of the International Monetary Fund, 15
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 499 (1976), and again in 1984 to increase the limitation of
liability amounts. 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 195 (1984).
See generally, Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup Bills.- Federal Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup
Costs, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1761 (1980); Healy, International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 1 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 317 (1970); Goldie, Liability for
Oil Pollution Disasters: International Law and the Delimitation of Competences in a Fed-
eral Policy, 6 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 303 (1975); Hardy, International Control of Marine
Pollution, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 296 (1971); Greenberg, IMCO: An Environmentalist's
Perspective, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 131 (1976).
156. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (1982).
157. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1982).
158. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1971) reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3742-43. R. Zener, supra note 150, at 694.
159. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 886 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982) (extending commerce clause authority to regulate
water pollution as broadly as possible).
160. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
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1972 legislation, renaming it the Clean Water Act. The most important
change made by the 1977 Amendments was the removal of the maximum
liability limit for oil spills.' 6' The amount of liability for ocean going
vessels is now $150 per ton (minimum $250,000 for tankers) with no
maximum amount, while inland oil barges are liable in the amount of
$125 per ton with a maximum limit of $125,000.162 Furthermore, pro-
tection of the coastal zones has been extended to 200 miles from the
coast, in accordance with new Fisheries legislation and the proposals for
the Law of the Sea Convention (III) on the Exclusive Economic Zone. 163
6. Exclusivity of Federal Remedy
Congressional language concerning other remedies found at several
places in the FWPCA leaves in doubt the question whether the statutory
remedies under FWPCA are exclusive of traditional remedies either
under common law or in Admiralty."6'
Exclusivity of remedy against the polluter for the government's
cleanup costs is clear. In re Oswego Barge Corp.,165 there had been an oil
spill following a grounding in the St. Lawrence Seaway. The United
States spent $8,062,981 to clean up United States territorial waters, and
paid an additional $768,265 to Canada for Canadian government cleanup
expenses. In addition to its claim under FWPCA, the United States
made additional claims against the vessel owner under traditional mari-
time law (tort) and federal common law public nuisance. These claims,
however, were dismissed as preempted by FWPCA. The Second Circuit
noted the statutory language preserving non-FWPCA remedies against
third parties, but felt it would create an anomaly for remedies against
owners to be inferred while remedies against third parties were expressly
preserved; accordingly, non-FWPCA claims asserted against owners
were found to have been preempted.' 66
In M/V Big Sam, 6 1 the vessel Big Sam collided with a tanker barge
causing an oil spill. In addition to a FWPCA claim, the government
brought suit against the Big Sam's owner and charterer under both the
Refuse Act and maritime tort. The Fifth Circuit held that the remedy
provided under FWPCA was not exclusive, and allowed the United
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (P) (1982), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS. 4326, 4389.
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1982).
163. 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 4326, 4390.
164. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (f)(1) (1982) ("[N]otwithstanding any other provision
of law"). See also 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(g) (1982) (dealing with third party liability). 33
U.S.C. § 1321(h)(2) (1982) (rights against third parties who caused or contributed to
discharges). See generally, Comment, Federal Water Pollution Control Act - The Federal
Government's Exclusive Remedy for Recoupment of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs, 53 TUL. L.
REv. 1421 (1979).
165. In Re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981). See also U.S. v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. Oswego Barge, 664 F.2d at 341.
167. United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1982).
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States to pursue non-FWPCA remedies against (non-discharging) third
parties whose actions caused oil spills.'6 ' In denying rehearing En Banc,
the Fifth Circuit noted that the statute's distinction between owners and
third parties was illogical, but stated that this inconsistency would have
to be corrected by Congress.169
Thus far, cases have dealt with the question of the government's rem-
edy against polluters and the government's remedy against "sole cause"
third parties. These cases have introduced confusion into the question of
overall liability, and must be addressed in any future revision of the stat-
ute."70 Although seven congresses have considered bills to deal with lia-
bility and comprehensive treatment for the oil pollution problem, and
two administrations have urged Senate advice and consent to the interna-
tional treaties, courageous positive action has yet to be taken.
7. Goals of Federal Controls and Practical Administration
Prior to the 1972 and 1977 legislation, there was no effective enforce-
ment of the water quality standards prescribed by the states.' 7' But in
1972, Congress established a national goal of eliminating polluting dis-
charges into navigable waters by 1985.172
In the first of two preliminary stages, to be achieved in 1977, industrial
point sources of water pollution were to adopt mitigating measures to
meet the standard of the best practicable control technology currently
available (BPT). '71 The second stage, to be met in 1983, set a higher
standard: the best available technology economically achievable. ' 71
Public health concerns led to pollution source limitations with an ample
margin of safety; the waters were to be both "fishable" and "swim-
168. Id. at 439-40.
169. Id. at 438-39.
170. On March 17, 1987, Congressman Jones (D.N.C.), Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, introduced the Comprehensive Liability and
Compensation Response Act of 1987, H.R. 1632, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987), which
encompassed a number of the problems that have surfaced in the legislation and the
common law in the past 20 years.
In the first place, H.R. 1632 would replace Section 311 of FWPCA, and would "pre-
empt" state laws as well as three limited federal pollution funds: The Trans Alaska Pipe-
line Liability Fund, supra note 156; The Deepwater Port Liability Fund, supra note 157;
and The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1982). Secondly, the
statute would establish uniform liability and liability limits which are in line with the
1984 I.M.O. Protocol to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, and substantially in excess
of the 1977 limits in current law.
171. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202-3 (1976).
172. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 101(a)(l), 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
173. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 301(b)(2)(A), 86
Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 131 1()(I)(A) (1972), amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1583.
174. Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972, § 301(b)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 816,
33 U.S.C. §. 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1972), amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
217, 91 Star. 1583.
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mable."' 17 Additionally, the EPA Administrator was directed to de-
velop standards limiting the amounts of toxic substances to be found in
waters subject to the statute, beginning with a statutory schedule of sub-
stances which was subject to addition at the Administrator's
discretion. 17 6
Section 402 of the statute177 authorized the EPA Administrator to
grant permits for polluting discharges, removing any penalty for pollut-
ing up to such limits. This permit scheme is known as the National Pol-
lution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) - a bureaucratic
misnomer whereby permission to pollute waters is granted under the
name of pollutant elimination.' In granting permits, the Administrator
was to consider a schedule of eventual improvements that would enable
the polluter to meet the 1977, 1983 and 1985 goals.
In the first five years of the program 42,000 dischargers applied for
permits. 1 9 The EPA Administrator attempted to mitigate the burden of
reviewing each of these thousands of applications by establishing regula-
tions for permitted levels of polluting discharges based on industry classi-
fication.' 8 A major industrial producer, Du Pont Chemical, challenged
this action as quasi-legislative and unauthorized under the statute, argu-
ing that each permit request must be evaluated individually.' 8 '
Once granted, some have suggested that the permits be viewed as
transferable private property. 82 Under this view, a polluter in posses-
sion of a permit would be able to sell the permit, or perhaps a portion
thereof, to allow others to pollute, much in the same way airlines are able
175. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 302, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1312(a) (1982) (wildlife and recreation uses "in and on" the water).
176. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982), amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, §§ 53(a), (b),
54(a), Pub. L. No. 45-217, §§ 53(a), (b), 54(a), 91 Stat. 1589-91. See generally, Silver,
Problems in Attempting to Translate Statutory Standards into Emissions Limitations
Under Air and Water Pollution Control Legislation, 22 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1122 (1977).
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
178. See generally, Arnold, Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State Imple-
mentation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 15 Bos.
COLL. INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL L. REV. 767 (1974); Davis & Glasser, The Dis-
charge Permit Program Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 - Improve-
ment of Water Quality Through the Regulation of Discharges from Industrial Facilities, 2
FORD. URB. L.J. 179 (1974); R. Hall, The Evolution & Implementation of EPA's Regula-
tory Program to Control the Discharge of Toxic Pollutants to the Nation's Waters, 10 NAT.
RES. LAWYER 507 (1977); Hall, The Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. REs. LAWYER
343 (1978). There is no similar provision for air pollution.
179. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132 (1977).
180. 430 U.S. at 122. Current regulations may be found in 40 C.F.R. § 125 (1987).
181. 430 U.S. at 132-33. Although the statutory language'was unclear on this point,
the Supreme Court held that the decision of the EPA Administrator to issue a legislative
type of regulation was reasonable in view of the "impossible burden" of individual adjudi-
cations. Id.
182. See Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control, 25 Public Pol-
icy 383, 387-89 (1977); R. DeLucia, An Evaluation of Marketable Permit Systems, EPA
Socioeconomic Environmental Series No. EPA-60015-74-030 (1974); J. Dales, Pollution,
Property and Prices, 77-100 (1968).
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to sell landing rights (slots) at very busy urban airports. 8 3
In February, 1987, Congress passed, over President Reagan's veto, a
revived and amended Water Quality Act 8 4 designed to expand and
strengthen the original Clean Water Act of 1977, and to commit addi-
tional resources to this vital task.
B. Air
1. Early Congressional Attempts at Air Pollution Control
Visible air pollution first attracted public attention in 1955, after it was
clearly understood that automobile emissions created the infamous smog
of Los Angeles. Non-stationary sources (such as automobiles) produce
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, hydrocarbons and particulates which,
after complex chemical processes, produce smog. Stationary sources
(such as power plants and industrial processes) release sulfur oxides, ni-
trogen oxides and particulates into the atmosphere that are not always
visible; therefore, political priority was awarded to non-stationary source
pollutants and regulation of stationary sources came more gradually.
The first federal legislation involving the air quality of the nation was
the Air Pollution Control - Research and Technical Assistance Act of
1955.185 This act provided financial assistance to states which sought to
control air pollution, but did not require states to take any action. The
Clean Air Act of 1963186 entailed minimal federal intervention through
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, by means of financial
assistance, research and development, where interstate air pollution was
found. 87 In 1965, minimal controls with federal enforcement machinery
were introduced for new model automobiles.'88 The Air Quality Act of
1967189 authorized Federal officials to enforce state air pollution stan-
dards after notification, and a 180-day grace period permitting state ac-
183. See generally, Trumbull, Federal Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution, 2
Ecology L.Q. 283 (1972). Similar arguments are made respecting "rights to emit" caused
by new and unused emission reduction credits which may be "banked" for future use
under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7473(c) (1982).
184. The bill, S. 1128, had passed in both the Senate and House by unanimous votes.
See 132 CONG. REC. H. 10,532 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986). On November 6, 1986, Presi-
dent Reagan pocket vetoed legislation expanding and strengthening the Clean Water Act,
the Water Quality Act of 1986, stating: "Unfortunately, this bill so far exceeds accepta-
ble levels of intended budgetary commitments that I must withhold my approval."
Congress overrode the Presidential veto with a vote of 86 to 14 in the Senate, 133
CONG. REC. S.1708 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) and a vote of.401 to 26 in the House, 133
CONG. REC. H525-26 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987).
185. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
186. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
187. Id. The policy was to encourage municipal, state and interstate action to abate air
pollution. Automotive emissions were gently treated by encouragement of research with
annual reports to Congress by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.188. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. See also Green, State Control of Interstate Air
Pollution, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 315 (1968).
189. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
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tion to achieve compliance.190
Because the environmental and health effects of the atmospheric re-
lease of toxic pollutants are not yet fully understood, there have been,
and continue to be disagreements as to the quantities which can be safely
absorbed by society for its economic welfare. Even after the deleterious
effects of air pollution on human health were acknowledged, the business
community resisted pressures to bow to environmental concerns in mak-
ing its decisions. This was due to the substantially higher costs that such
compliance entailed: for the stationary source it would mean new meth-
ods of filtering, washing and electrostatic action, instead of the tradi-
tional smokestack; for the non-stationary source it would mean new fuel
sources or more efficient internal combustion engines. Thus, the cost-
benefit analyses typically utilized in business decisions involving air pol-
lution issues impeded the regulatory process. For example, the man-
dated reduction of non-stationary source pollutants economically
challenged the American automobile industry which was already in
trouble because of foreign competition.
By 1970, the EPA listed National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for seven pollutants: total suspended particulates (TSP), sulfur
oxides, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone hydrocarbons and
lead. Thus these became the principal concern of EPA, awaiting further
research on other pollutants of the clean air.
Later that year, Congress significantly amended the Clean Air Act,91
by imposing a requirement that states meet air quality standards to be
established under the Act within specified periods. 92  The statutory
190. Id. See also, Middleton, Summary of the Air Quality Act of 1967, 10 ARIZ. L.
REv. 25 (1968).
191. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 166 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970)
(amended 1977).
192. See Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 111-112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683-86 (1970) (introducing
new regulations of new stationary sources and new national emission standards for haz-
ardous air pollutants). Section 113 of this Act deals with enforcement actions. 84 Stat.
1676, 1686.
The idea of National Standards for Air Quality was once considered to be a radical
departure from states' rights. Under the 1967 Act (Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485)
States were to establish ambient air standards within air quality regions and to develop
plans to attain or implement the standards. Ambient Air Quality generally means the
amount of pollution in the atmosphere of an area over time, usually "parts per million."
See National Air Pollution Control Administration (H.E.W.), Guidelines for the Devel-
opment of Air Quality Standards and Implementation Plans (May, 1969). While "parts
per million" has the ring of scientific accuracy it also has the vagueness preferred by
industry and administrators as to whether over-all goals have been met. For a criticism
of the 1967 procedures, see J. Esposito, Vanishing Air, 152-181 (1970), a report for Ralph
Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive Law. The National Air Pollution Control
Administration (of H.E.W.) was to determine "air quality control regions" based on me-
teorological and topographical data, but the fixing of a maximum allowable release of
pollutants into the air was to be achieved by the states. The frustrations and failures of
the procedure in individual cases are amply demonstrated in United States v. Bishop
Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970) cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970) which concerns a twenty year struggle against noxious gases
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changes were made necessary by the failure of states to act under the
earlier provisions. Congress also provided that new stationary sources of
pollution could not exceed the national standard,1 93 and that when old
stationary sources were modified by any physical changes,1 94 or by
changes in the method of operation which increased emissions of pollu-
tants, 195 then the old stationary sources were required to meet the new
national standard. 96
2. The Federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
Under The Federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,197 the earlier
statutes were completely revised and the entire package codified as Air
Pollution Prevention and Control. The amendments required the EPA
Administrator to establish NAAQS,' 9s to protect public health and pub-
lic welfarefree of a consideration of the difficulties incurred in complying
with the standards.199 However, the EPA Administrator could consider
such economic and technological difficulties with respect to the timetable
and odors emitted by a rendering and animal reduction plant. The 1970 statute reserves
primary responsibility for assuring air quality to the states (42 U.S.C. 7407(a) (1982)),
EPA has become the "legislator" for stationary and non-stationary source pollutants
under its authority to determine standards.
193. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § II1(d), 84 Stat. 1676, 1684 (1970) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (1982).
194. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 11 1(a)(2)-(4), 84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (1970).
195. Id. § 1l1(a)(4).
196. Id. § I11(e); see also id. § 112(c).
197. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7626 (1982)).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1982).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a). Under the statutory formula in 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1982),
primary NAAQS are requisite to protect public health, with an adequate margin of
safety, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1), whereas secondary NAAQS are requisite to protect the
public welfare, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
States are to respond to NAAQS with State Implementation Plans (SIP), adopted after
notice and a hearing. Primary NAAQS were to be attained within 3 years from approval
of the SIP, whereas secondary NAAQS were to be attained within a reasonable time. 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1982).
Congress also dealt with state inadequacies by vesting the EPA Administrator with the
authority to amend SIPs to insure compliance with NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2).
Approved SIPs may be enforced in state or federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1982).
EPA remains free to correct its own earlier interpretations of the complex statutory
formulae. See Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334.(9th Cir. 1975).
Since states have considerable discretion in the definition of stationary sources for the
purpose of SIPs, there has arisen the concept of "Bubbles," whereby new construction
which might increase emissions to an impermissible level can still be approved if reduc-
tions in emissions elsewhere in the operation are achieved by closing already approved
facilities. Despite policy disagreements in the circuits (ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d
319 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982)), the
Supreme Court has given broad approval to the Bubble Concept; see, e.g., Chevron USA,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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for compliance. 200 In other words, cost-benefit analysis is relevant to
the-question of the timetable by which NAAQS are to be achieved, but
not to setting the standards themselves.2° '
The NAAQS have precipitated a number of problems in the area of
automobile emissions regulation.20 2 In contrast to the approach of the
New York courts in Boomer,2°3 which did not order defendants to alter
their mode of operation and cease polluting due to the belief that the
technology involved would not improve, Congress attempted to force
technological change in the automobile industry. 2° The 1970 Act re-
quired that then permissible exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons and car-
bon monoxide be reduced by 90% by the 1975 model year.20 5 The 1975
model year emission reduction requirement could be suspended by the
EPA for one year if "effective control technology, processes, operating
methods or other alternatives [were] not available or [had] not been
available for a sufficient period of time . "206 This suspension was
granted to the industry in 1973.207 By 1974, Congress had relented on its
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) (1982).
201. In Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, reh. denied 429 U.S. 873 (1976),
state enforcement actions were approved in a setting to encourage state authority to grant
special treatment by variances. (Variances granted by state environmental agencies are
subject to EPA approval and are considered to be revisions of an SIP under 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(3)(A) (1982)). Missouri's SIP included emission limits on sulfur dioxide which
would have forced technological changes on coal burning energy generation by St. Louis
Union Electric Co. which, the utility claimed, were economically and technologically
infeasible and invalid under 42 U.S.C. § 7410 as not practicable or reasonable. The EPA
Administrator had approved the SIP so that the argument that states were not permitted
to impose technological change on their own initiative in violation of federal uniformity
was not appropriate. In its opinion, however, the Supreme Court's support for EPA
approval of the Missouri SIP was based on the idea that infeasibility for economic or
technological reasons was not part of the factors to be considered by EPA on a state SIP.
427 U.S. 246. Thus, states are to be free to select the political mixture of types of controls
to achieve the NAAQS standards. For EPA disapproval of an SIP, see Kennecott Cop-
per Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
(Nevada SIP). As a result of this decision Congress added a so-called "tall stacks" provi-
sion to 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1982). Further protections for industry are found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(d).
202. The first federal concern with automobile exhaust emissions came in the 1963
Amendments. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 6, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), concerned with research and
development only, but in 1970 automobile exhaust emissions were drastically controlled
for the first time. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 202(b), 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1857
(1970) (amended 1977), beginning with mandated reductions of hydrocarbons and car-
bon monoxide in exhaust emissions.
203. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970). See supra notes 53-60.
204. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
205. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 202(b), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f)(i)
(1970) (amended 1977).
206. Id. § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1692 (1970). For a critical view, see Currie, Relaxation
of Implementation Plan Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 78 MICH. L. REV.
155 (1979).
207. The 1972 auto industry application for the suspension of the 1975 model year
deadline was denied by the EPA Administrator because he could not certify at that time
that the technology was unavailable, and in fact predicted that the technology would be
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1975 goals by permitting the EPA Administrator to extend the 1975
deadline to 1977 on proof of a good faith attempt to comply with the
1975 standards.2"'
Regarding the 1977 Act's 1983 goal of limiting pollution sources by
the "best available technology economically achievable," 2" Congress ac-
tually relaxed the earlier requirements by enacting several revisory meas-
ures.210 The 1983 deadlines for toxic pollutants were extended on the
'condition that the best available emission control technology, taking into
account the costs of compliance, be employed.2 1' The deadline was simi-
available by the 1975 model year. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The EPA's unexplained assumptions underlying predictions
of available technology were remanded for further review. The practical consideration
was the unfairness to complying manufacturers of last minute Congressional absolution
of non-complying manufacturers. 478 F.2d 615. In 1973 the EPA Administrator
granted the suspension.
208. Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 5, 88 Stat. 258 (1974). The EPA Administrator extended
the suspension in 1975 but new legislation, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
revised the provisions. See Title II, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 201-226, 91 Stat. 751-769
(1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)). The "escape hatch" of
the 1977 legislation for new motor vehicles now provides (42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(C)):
"Action revising any standard for any period may be taken by the Administra-
tor under subparagraph (B) only if he finds-
(i) that compliance with the emission standards otherwise applicable for
such model year cannot be achieved by technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives reasonably expected to be available for pro-
duction for such model year without increasing cost or decreasing fuel
economy to an excessive and unreasonable degree; and (ii) the National
Academy of Sciences has not, pursuant to its study and investigation under
subsection (c) of this section, issued a report substantially contrary to the
findings of the Administrator under clause (i)."
Respecting carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, "escape hatch"
waiver provisions are found in 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C):
".. The Administrator may grant such waiver if he finds that protection of the
public health does not require attainment of such 90 percent reduction for car-
bon monoxide for the model years to which such waiver applies in the case of
such vehicles and engines and if he determines that-
(i) such waiver is essential to the public interest or the public health and wel-
fare of the United States;
(ii) all good faith efforts have been made to meet the standards established by
this subsection;
(iii) the applicant has established that effective control technology, processes,
operating, methods, or other alternatives are not available or have not been
available with respect to the model in question for a sufficient period of time to
achieve compliance prior to the effective date of such standards, taking into
consideration costs, driveability and fuel economy; and
(iv) studies and investigations of the National Academy of Sciences conducted
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and other information available to him
has not indicated that technology, processes, or other alternatives are available
See also 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A) and (B) for nitrogen oxide waivers.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(iii) (1982).
210. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109, 91 Stat. 685, 697 (1977) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 741 l(g) (1982). The categories were revised to be: toxic pollutants, conventional
pollutants and non-conventional (i.e., unclassified) pollutants.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (1982).
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larly extended for conventional pollutants on the condition that polluters
employ the best system of continuous emission reduction.212
These new categories and the new standard are to be determined using
cost-benefit analysis.2 13 That is, the cost of attaining a reduction in efflu-
ents is to be compared with the benefits derived from such a reduction.
Considerable litigation has been brought by industry groups regarding
the methods of weighing various factors in a cost-benefit analysis. For
example, in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n,2 1 ' the Supreme Court
sustained the Agency's cost-benefit analysis under the best practicable
technology standard 21 5 against attack by the industry, which tried to im-
pose its views of a proper cost-benefit analysis on the Agency. 216
In addition to legislative relaxation of emission standards, there has
arguably been a further reduction in the efficacy of these standards
through a retroactive interpretation by the EPA of fuel efficiency under
the Automobile Fuel Efficiency Act of 1980.217 Under the Act, the al-
ready permissive standards for auto manufacturers were to be applied to
an entire "sales fleet" of models on a "sales weighted" basis, rather than
to each specific model in a manufacturer's line for a particular year.21s
The standard was referred to as the "CAFE" (Corporate Average Fuel
Economy). Penalties to be imposed annually by the Department of
Transportation were fixed at $5.00 per tenth of a mile by which the
CAFE exceeded the target fuel economy, multiplied by the number of
cars in the manufacturer's sales fleet. 219 These new factors might reduce
manufacturers' potential liability by permitting them to apply subsequent
fuel economy improvements to unsatisfactory results as a three year
"carry forward" or "carry back. ' '22 °
Congress provided additional discretion to the EPA in the develop-
ment of the fuel economy tests after 1975. Congress authorized the EPA
to develop procedures which would be more accurate or easier to admin-
ister than the 1975 model year tests provided in the statute, 221 although
such revised or substituted provisions were required to yield "compara-
212. 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(1)(C) (1982).
213. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments in 42 U.S.C. § 7617 (1982) require the
EPA Administrator to prepare an "economic impact assessment" before adoption of new
or revised standards, analyzing costs of compliance, inflation, competition costs to con-
sumers and energy use.
214. 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
215. Id. at 76-77.
216. 449 U.S. 64. Plaintiffs requested variances from the Standard granted to them
based on financial inability to adopt the measures required. Id.
217. Pub. L. No. 96-425, 94 Stat. 1821, amending the Motor Vehicle Information and
Cost Savings Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947 as amended by Pub. L. No.
94-163, 89 Stat. 871, 901 (1975).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 2003(a) (1982).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 2008(b)(1) (1982) (characterized as the "Gas Guzzler" tax).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 2002(e).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 2003(d)(1).
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ble" results.222
In 1979 Ford and General Motors challenged the testing procedures
administered after 1975 by the EPA, asserting that the test results under
the revised procedures were flawed since their measured fuel economies
for those years were worse than that of the 1975 model year.22 3 The
Sixth Circuit's response required the EPA to develop procedures to es-
tablish an adjustment factor for current test results, in order to determine
the CAFE. Under the Sixth Circuit's order, the EPA was to determine
which specific test procedures should be adjusted, and how great those
adjustments should be; accordingly, the EPA's new rule, promulgated
after three and a half years of study, granted "manufacturer-specific
CAFE adjustments" to compensate for the adverse impact of the post-
1975 changes in test procedures.2 24
The EPA also established regulations to determine the CAFE effects
of future procedural changes in testing, including a prospective change
effecting 1987 model year vehicles with over 6200 accumulated miles.2 2
Essentially these new formulae would yield higher fuel economy ratings
for Ford and GM, thereby reducing the financial penalties for their fail-
ure to meet the standards by the required deadline. Restating this propo-
sition unfairly, the community can get clean air only through financial
sacrifice by consumers.
In challenging the EPA's new rule, the Center for Auto Safety success-
fully argued that the EPA's retroactive CAFE adjustments were applied
only in a manner which was favorable to the manufacturers' position. 22 6
The Court disapproved of the EPA's refusal to make retroactive negative
adjustments; accordingly, the EPA decision to apply the CAFE adjust-
ments only to cars with higher mileage accumulation limits was reversed
and remanded.2 27
The consequences of repeated postponements of auto emission controls
can be seen and felt in the skies above American cities. A December,
1985 EPA study noted that although the Clean Air Act sets a maximum
222. 15 U.S.C. § 2003(dXl) reads in part, "Procedures so established with respect to
passenger automobiles (other than for purposes of Section 2006 of this title) shall be the
procedures utilized by the EPA Administrator for model year 1975 (weighed 55 percent
urban cycle and 45 percent highway cycle), or procedures which yield comparable
results."
223. General Motors Corp. v. Costle, 698 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1982).
224. 50 Fed. Reg. 27,172 (1985), codified in 40 C.F.R. Part 600 (1987) (Fuel Economy
of Motor Vehicles).
225. 50 Fed. Reg. 27,180-181.
226. Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 806 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The
test procedure changes involved distance measurement, inertia weight categories, dyna-
mometer controllers, laboratory humidity, exhaust gas samplers, test dual properties and
energy-efficient oils. Id.
227. Id. at 1076. The Center for Auto Safety had argued, and it was conceded, that if
adjustments in road load power settings and mileage accumulation limits had been made
retroactively, they would have negated the manufacturers' gains from the CAFE adjust-
ments already authorized by the EPA.
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allowable carbon monoxide level of nine parts of carbon monoxide mole-
cules per million molecules of air, Los Angeles has 27.4 parts per million,
Denver has 24.0, Phoenix has 20.3, Newark has 17.7, New York City has
16.0, Minneapolis-St. Paul has 14.7, Boston has 14.1, Baltimore has 13.9,
Washington has 13.8, and Chicago has 13.3.228
The failures recorded above demonstrate that tougher legislation and
tougher administration are required. Non-complying cities were sup-
posed to suffer losses in federal highway funding after a December 31,
1987 deadline. It appears that an additional seventy-three communities
will join the seventy-one communities already supposedly penalized for
failure to comply, or even to demonstrate a "good faith" effort to com-
ply, with EPA standards. The economic considerations which dictated
that present day automobiles need not have improved fuel efficiency may
eventually force limits on the number of future automobiles to be manu-
factured or sold or operated in the United States.
C. Noise Control
In the public mind, the concept of noise control has always been asso-
ciated with the problem of airport noise.229 Private citizen action against
jet noise at airports is impractical because of the very narrow scope of
relief in the traditional over-flight action,230 and the impossibility (of win-
228. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1987, § 4, at 26E, col. 1. The deadline for compliance was
Dec. 31, 1987. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1982).
Sanctions for failure to meet approved SIPs include limits on the construction of major
new stationary sources (42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I)) and restrictions on federal assistance
to all manner of projects except those dealing with safety, mass transit and transportation
projects related to air quality improvement. 42 U.S.C. § 7506. This would appear to
target highway construction.
229. Airport runways have been extended to accommodate commercial jet aircraft the
noise of which (especially prior to take-off) is of a different volume and intensity than that
produced by propeller driven aircraft. Accompanying the technology change in the avia-
tion industry has been the expansion of city suburbs to border the newly expanded air-
ports. The transformation of commercial aviation to jets was accomplished in the period
from 1959 to 1962.
230. See Batten v. United States, 292 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1961), modified in 306 F.2d
580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 955. See also City of Newark v. Eastern
Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); Harvey, Landowners Rights in the AirAge: The
Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1313 (1958).
Where there has been direct overflight which "enters the close" of the landowner,
thereby destroying his livelihood, the Supreme Court has created a remedy by Inverse
Condemnation; the nearby federal airport is required to extend its land takings by emi-
nent domain to include the complainant's land. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946). The remedy has been extended to cases involving airports owned by munici-
palities. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) and Baker v. Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, 39 Cal.3d 862, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986). See also Carroll, Airport Noise Pollution Dam-
ages, 15 Urb. 621 (1983).
State constitutions may go beyond land takings so as to require state governments to
compensate for damage which did not involve "taking" or overflight. See Alevizos v.
Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974). See also Martin
v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965);
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ning the social utility analysis of a nuisance action.23' Accordingly, ef-
forts moved from the courts into the political arena when local
ordinances attempted to limit jet operations.232 The Supreme Court,
however, has held that federal preemption will make it impossible for the
local community or even the state to control commercial jet aircraft as
sovereigns.233 The question of the authority of the municipality to regu-
late as landlords of the airport234 has not been definitely determined by
the Supreme Court, but it appears that the landlord status may not be
abused so as to impede federal power under the Commerce Clause.235
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA),236 created in 1958 to succeed to
the aviation safety responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
proceeded slowly and cautiously in addressing airport noise. A 1966 Re-
port of the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel237 concluded that solutions could
only come from the federal government, a source supposedly not com-
promised by economic interests.23 s It was not until 1968 that a compro-
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); Baker v. Burbank -
Glendale - Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal.3d 862, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v.
City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329 (1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 820 (1980); Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496
P.2d 480 (1972).
231. See generally, Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, I N.J.Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645
(1948); Atkinson v. Bernard, 223 Or. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960). See also Thornburg v.
Port of Portland, 244 Or. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966) (an appeal on rehearing of the action in
note 230 supra); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.2d 582, 39
Cal.Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964) (public policy against enjoining aircraft operations).
Cf Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (N.C. 1982); Drybread v.
City of St. Louis, 634 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
232. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956)
(ordinance forbidding overflight at less than 1,000 feet unconstitutional); American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1017 (1969) (ordinance controlling noise). See also Town of East Haven v. Eastern Air-
lines, 331 F.Supp. 16 (D. Conn. 1971); Supplementary Opinion, 333 F. Supp. 338 (D.
Conn. 1971), aff'd 470 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 965 (1973).
233. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See also
Krueger v. Mitchell, 112 Wis.2d 88, 332 N.W.2d 733 (1983).
234. See Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Cf. San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283
(S.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
See also Air Transport Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
235. British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 564 F.2d
1002 (2d Cir. 1977). See supra note 42.
236. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
237. The President's Office of Science and Technology was directed to prepare a pro-
gram for the control of aircraft noise by President Johnson in 1965. In 1966 the Office
published its report, "Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports" Office of Science
and Technology (1966), General Conclusion.
238. Id. Conclusion 4. The perceived noise level in decibels (PNdB) at levels below 90
did not produce complaints at the Los Angeles International Airport, while many com-
plaints were made when the noise was above the 105 PNdB level. (Conclusion 5). The
Port of New York Authority had concluded in 1964 that the maximum noise level on the
ground for take-off would be 112 PNdB. Port of New York Auth. v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Werlich & Krinsky, The Aviation Noise
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mise satisfactory to the elements of the aviation industry - the carriers,
the composite aircraft manufacturers and the jet engine and other com-
ponent manufacturers - was achieved.239 By January, 1969, the FAA
had authored Noise Control Regulations.2"
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Noise Control Act,24" ' which
provided that the EPA Administrator research the aircraft noise problem
and deliver a Report to Congress by July of 1973.242 In response to the
Report, amendments to the FAA statute were enacted whereby, after
consultation between the EPA and the FAA, regulations promulgated by
the FAA would provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise
and sonic booms.243
An important case concerning Federal preemption in noise regulation
is City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.2" The City of Bur-
bank adopted a curfew ordinance applicable to the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport forbidding the take-off and landing of jet aircraft between 11 p.m.
and 7 a.m. The Supreme Court held the curfew ordinance to be uncon-
stitutional.24 No express preemption existed, 2 but the pervasive nature
of Federal regulation of aircraft noise (including the 1972 Federal Noise
Control Act) led to the conclusion of preemption. There was no room
for local curfews or other local controls because the many factors being
considered by the Administration required a uniform and exclusive sys-
tem of federal regulation.247
Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines and the Legal Liability Shuf-
fle, 15 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 69 (1981).
239. Control and Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom Amendment to the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1431
(1968). See Larsen, Improving the Airport Environment: Effect of the 1969 FAA Regula-
tion on Noise, 55 IOWA L. REv. 808 (1970). A new section 611 K permitted revocation
of airworthiness certificates under criteria of economic reasonableness, technological
practicability and appropriateness. 14 C.F.R. § 36.5.
240. 14 C.F.R. § 36. See also Noise Pollution and Abatement Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1854-1858 (1964).
241. Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-
4918 (1982).
242. Id. § 4904.
243. Id. 14 C.F.R. § 36. EPA and FAA collaboration may be illustrated by the 1977
Amendments to the FAA Aircraft Noise Standards, 42 Fed.Reg. 12, 360 (1977).
244. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). In Lock-
heed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970), the District
Court ruled in a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and en-
joined enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed because thefield had been preempted
by Congress, and the particular ordinance directly conflicted with an F.A.A. order con-
cerning runway use. 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972). The Burbank case should be com-
pared with Askew v. American Waterways, 411 U.S. 325 (1973). See supra note 34.
Justice Douglas, here the federalist and author of the 5-4 majority decision, had in that
term refused, as a naturalist, to interfere with local regulation to protect the environment
in the unanimous decision in Askew.
245. 411 U.S. at 633. Accord Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303
(1944).
246. 411 U.S. at 639-40.
247. Id. at 652. The dissent of Justice Rehnquist found preemption only in the regula-
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Although the FAA and the EPA were concerned with the peripheral
problems of runway use and curfews, the central problem of noisy first
generation jet aircraft, built under earlier airworthiness certificates, was
by-passed. Finally in December, 1976, the FAA, encouraged by Presi-
dent Ford and Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman, promul-
gated rules to solve the problem.248 The years of the Carter
Administration were devoted to the de-regulation of the domestic com-
mercial aviation industry. Proposals to force technological change on
noise levels were mixed with cost-benefit analyses of the retrofit change
and various schemes to fund it.249 Finally, at the beginning of the 1980
Election Year, Congress enacted and President Carter approved the 1980
Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act.250
The Act is replete with compromises and special interest protections,
but it encourages local proprietors to devise solutions to the noise prob-
lem by means of grants of federal money for noise abatement, and the
publication of Noise Exposure Maps.251  As the present fleet of noisy jet
aircraft are phased out we may well see a reduction in airport noise in the
1990's and its elimination in the new century. Public attention is now
directed to the economic distress of the aviation industry - the direct
result of deregulation, rather than to the noise problem. However, the
noise pollution concerns of the United States government have resulted
in the beginning of international efforts to deal with the airport noise
problem.252
tion of aircraft in flight in the 1958 and 1968 legislation but not over the ground space of
airports and states that the 1972 legislation clearly intended to maintain the status quo.
41 Fed.Reg. 56016-56 (Dec. 23, 1976) incorporated in 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.301-91.311. See
Comment, Current State of the Law in Aircraft Noise Pollution Control, 43 J. AIR L. &
Comm. 199 (1977); Rockett, Airport Noise: Did the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement
Act of 1979 Solve the Problem?, 52 J. AIR L. & COMM. 499 (1986). The effect of the
change was to eliminate older, noisier aircraft (which were also wasteful of then expensive
fuel), and to force the "retrofit" or reconstruction of newer, less noisy aircraft.
248. "Operating Noise Limits," 14 C.F.R. § 91-305 (1977) (new subpart). The carriers
were to be in compliance with the new standards as to 50% of their fleet by January 1,
1981, and 100% by January 1, 1983, later extended by Congress to January 1, 1986. 49
U.S.C. §§ 2123-4 (1983). Some further extensions were granted, 50 Fed.Reg. 41,327(1985), 14 C.F.R. § 31.5.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c) (1982). See also Lineas Aereas del Caribe, S.A. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, 791 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
250. "Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979", Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat.
50 (1980) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1982)). See also FAA Noise
Regulations, 1980, 14 CFR § 36.1-1581.
251. 49 U.S.C. § 2103 (1982). The statute puts severe limits on suits by property own-
ers acquiring interests in lands surrounding an airport after February 18, 1980, unless the
owner can show significant change in the type or frequency of airport operations, airport
layout, airport flight patterns or an increase in nightime operations. 49 U.S.C. § 2107
(1982).
252. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of
the United Nations, called a Special Meeting on Aircraft Noise on November 24, 1969, at
Montreal, which led to the establishment of the ICAO Committee on Aircraft Noise and
a new Annex 16 on Aircraft Noise, approved April 2, 1971. See ICAO Doec. 8857
NOISE (1969).
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D. Toxics
Just when the environmentalists of the 1960's thought that environ-
mental problems were manageable, that the automobile exhaust emis-
sions which caused the infamous smog over Los Angeles could be
eliminated, and that the river and ocean pollution caused by crude petro-
leum could be reduced, the public was shocked by the realization that
toxic chemicals were being deliberately and accidently released into the
air and water in the course of their manufacture, storage, transportation
and disposal. By 1980 the situation could only be described as an envi-
ronmental emergency.
One of the most frightening aspects of the toxics problem is the dispo-
sal of waste chemicals in such a manner as to imperil supplies of drinking
water. Of the more than 50,000 dump sites in the U.S., 20,000 are said to
be seriously contaminated, and at least 2,000 have been identified as
presenting imminent threats to human health.253 According to EPA
figures, each site will require an average of $3.6 million to clean, making
the total cost approximately $7.2 billion.254
A well-known incident involved a community located near Niagara
Falls called Love Canal, New York. This residential suburb had been
built over a concealed dump in which some 352,000,000 pounds of indus-
trial chemical wastes were buried. In August 1978, the New York
Health Commissioner declared a health emergency and President Carter
designated Love Canal as a Federal Disaster Area. New York State be-
gan buying 240 abandoned homes at a cost of $10 million, and spent an
additional $22 million on relocation. In 1982, when additional traces of
the chemical dioxin appeared, more homes had to be abandoned; the re-
lated cleanup and litigation continues.255
A major problem with toxic wastes has been that many of the chemi-
cals involved were not originally identified as toxic. For example,
polychlorinated biphenils (PCB's) were used for some 45 years before
their dangers became evident. Indeed, at one time the toxicity of chemi-
cal wastes was erroneously thought to be removed by penetrating soil
and rock over decades. In addition, certain toxics like DDT continue to
be used extensively, notwithstanding their recognized destructive effect
on the environment.256
Furthermore, the chemical industry is constantly developing new syn-
thetic chemicals of unknown toxicity and long-term effects.257 It is very
difficult for government agencies to keep abreast of all of the vital activi-
ties of the chemical industry. Congress has cautiously begun to attempt
the long process of regulating the development of new toxic chemicals,
253. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
254. Id.
255. See Bauver, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modem Tragedy, 11
Env. L. Nw. U. 133 (1980).
256. See supra note 4, at 192-204.
257. Id. at 7-9.
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and the clean-up of waste dumps and accidental spills. Meanwhile the
EPA, lacking in zeal and skill, shuffled toxic wastes from site to site in
pitiful response to the national environmental emergency.
1. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA),258 the EPA Administrator determines the criteria considered
in identifying hazardous wastes, taking into account: toxicity, persis-
tence, biodegradability, potential for accumulation in tissue, and related
factors including, flammability and corrosiveness.25 9
RCRA also requires the EPA Administrator to establish standards for
the generation, transportation and disposal of toxic chemicals. 26° Key to
the Act's regulation of these chemicals is a mandatory record keeping of
their histories from manufacture to disposal.26'
The RCRA system requires businesses to obtain permits to generate,
transport or dispose of toxic chemicals.2 62 The EPA can inspect chemi-
cal facilities at any time.263 The Act provides for civil and criminal pen-
alties for violations of its provisions,2 but there are more than 50,000
firms subject to RCRA, and not enough inspectors to carry out the task
of supervision. Perhaps appreciating the enormity of its task, Congress
included a provision in RCRA which states that nothing in the Act is to
be construed as prohibiting any State from imposing its own more strin-
gent requirements.
265
Recent case law indicates that RCRA strict liability can be imposed on
acts of disposal occurring prior to the Act's passage in 1976.266
258. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a).
260. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-24.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(B).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 6927.
264. Criminal penalties are specified at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)-(f); civil penalties at 42
U.S.C. § 6928(g).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 6929.
266. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). The District Court had rejected the
RCRA claim because negligence had not been alleged or proved.
Strict liability was held to be the standard of the 1976 legislation and the 1984 amend-
ments, 810 F.2d at 738. While conceding that the purpose.of the 1984 amendments was
to "clarify" the liability language, the Eighth Circuit found that the the 1984 Amend-
ments had merely legislated the intent of the 94th Congress to impose liability upon past
non-negligent off-site generators and transporters of hazardous waste. See H.R. REP.
No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 119, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5649, 5690.
The District Court also found that RCRA did not apply to past non-negligent off-site
generators and transporters of hazardous substances, but it did apply CERCLA retroac-
tively despite denying the recovery of cleanup costs incurred before the effective date of
the CERCLA statute. Applying a strict liability standard with joint and several responsi-
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2. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976
Whereas RCRA aims to regulate existing sources of toxic pollution,
the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976267 is concerned with-the test-
ing of new chemical substances.2 61 Under the Act, manufacturers must
give notice to the EPA before manufacturing any new chemical
substances.
2 69
The policy of the Act places the burden on the manufacturer to de-
velop adequate data regarding the effects of the proposed toxic sub-
stance.2 70 The EPA is empowered to regulate any toxic substance which
presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,
although its authority should not "create unnecessary economic barriers
to technological innovation."1
2 71
3. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 - Superfund
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund) 272 was the result of hasty
compromise at a special session of Congress in 1980. Superfund encom-
passes hazardous and polluting substances other than oil and gas.273 It
authorizes the President to prepare a National Contingency Plan in deal-
ing with hazardous and polluting toxic substances in order to protect
human health and welfare, as well as the environment. 4 President Rea-
gan signed an Executive Order in August, 1981, in which he delegated
the responsibility for Plan amendment and all other Plan-related func-
tions vested in him by the Superfund Act to the EPA Administrator. 27 5
However, this executive order was subsequently revoked in 1987.276
The Plan authorizes the federal government to use Superfund money
to cleanup releases into the environment of hazardous, polluting or toxic
bility, the District Court found NEPACCO liable as an owner or operator under CER-
CLA, 579 F. Supp. at 844. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982).
267. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976), amended by 15
U.S.C. §§ 2642-2654 (1986) (amendments contain provisions which address the problem
of emergency response to the asbestos hazard).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b).
270. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b).
271. Id.
272. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). See Note, Recovery of Clean Up Costs Under
CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181 (1986).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Note, Federal and State Remedies
to Cleanup Hazardous Waste Sites, 84 U. MICH. L. REV. 379 (1986). See also Exxon
Corp. v. Hunt, 481 A.2d 271, 97 N.J. 526 (1984), probable jurisdiction, 105 S. Ct. 3474
(1985).
275. Ex. Ord. No. 12316, Aug. 14, 1981, 46 F.R. 42237, amended by Ex. Ord. No.
12418, May 5, 1985, 48 F.R. 20891.
276. Ex. Ord. No. 12580, Jan. 23, 1987, 52 F.R. 2929. See 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1986).
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substances by owners or operators of disposal sites or vessels and other
transport facilities. 77 Such owners or operators are liable for cleanup
costs. The only statutory defenses to liability are acts of God, acts of war
and acts or omissions by a third party." 8
Superfund is a trust fund, financed by taxes on chemical feedstocks,
crude oil and imported petroleum products, and penalties and related
sources from producers, which is used to cover the response costs of the
government.27 9 Since Superfund is a limited resource, it does not pre-
empt state efforts to create other funds to compensate for hazardous
waste cleanup costs. 280
Superfund legislation came up for renewal during the 1986 Congres-
sional election campaign, was approved by both houses and, despite ini-
tial indications of a possible veto because of its tax provisions, was signed
into law by the President. 28  The 1986 Amendments specify timetables
for cleanup as well as cleanup standards.282 Provisions for the commu-
nity's involvement in the cleanup,283 and for private damage suits against
toxic waste dumpers are also included.284 Most important, however, was
the substantial increase in funding that the amendments provided. 2
85
One critical issue now in litigation is whether the Act creates liability
for the clean up of spills which had occurred prior to its enactment. This
issue was presented to the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. 286
A dissolved Delaware corporation was a chemical manufacturer,
transporter of waste products, and operator of a hazardous waste dump
site. The corporation dumped eighty-five 55-gallon drums of toxic waste
at a site in 1971. The EPA learned of the hazardous wastes in 1979, and
began cleanup activity in April, 1980.287 The EPA sued to recover reim-
bursement costs pursuant to RCRA in August, 1980.288
On December 11, 1980, the Superfund legislation was enacted. The
cleanup of the site occurred between June and November of 1981, and in
August, 1982, an amended complaint pursuant to the Superfund legisla-
277. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 9631-41.
280. 42 U.S.C. 9604(d).
281. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
282. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 121, 100 Stat. 1613, 1672 (1986) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604-9606 (Supp. IV 1986).
283. Id. §§ 300-330, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. IV 1986).
284. Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1986).
285. The 1980 Superfund provided $1.6 billion over 5 years while the 1986 renewal
provides $8.5 billion over 5 years. Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 501-531, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
The House voted 386 in favor, 27 opposed, 132 CONG. Rnc. H.9634 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1986), and the Senate voted 88 in favor, 8 opposed, 132 CONG. REC. S.14943 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1986).
286. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
287. Id. at 730.
288. Id.
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tion was filed.289
On appeal the defendant argued that CERCLA cannot be applied to
acts committed before the effective date of the statute (December 11,
1980), and that the new strict liability standard would violate due process
by the taking of property without compensation.2 9°
Despite the presumption against retroactive application and the ab-
sence of expressly retroactive language, the Appeals Court found that
Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect since the statu-
tory language refers to actions and conditions in the past tense, and the
statutory scheme was described as "overwhelmingly remedial and
retroactive." 291
The Appeals Court held that due process had been satisfied because
there was a rational legislative purpose for retroactive application of the
legislation,2 92 and because Congress had not acted in an arbitrary and
irrational manner in imposing liability for cleanup on those parties who
created and profited from hazardous waste sites, and on the industry as a
whole. 293 The Court considered the cleanup as an abatement of an immi-
nent and substantial danger to public health and the environment by the
removal of a public nuisance, rather than as a taking of property.294
CONCLUSION
This short review of legislative and judicial solutions to complex
problems of the human environment demonstrates that many problems
289. Id.
290. Id. at 733-734. A related issue is the question of whether private citizens may
bring civil actions against polluters, seeking injunctions and civil penalties to the govern-
ment, for past violations of a NPDES permit. See supra note 177. See Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), reversed 108
S. Ct. 376 (1988). Cf Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.
1985). In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376
(1988) the Supreme Court held that there was no federal jurisdiction for wholly past
violations but there would be for good faith allegations of "continuous" or "intermittent"
violations.
291. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 733.
292. Id. at 734.
293. Id. (applying the rationale of a Ninth Circuit District Court in the lengthy litiga-
tion involving environmental contamination by improper hazardous waste disposal pro-
cedures at the U.S. Army's Rocky Mountain Arsenal at Denver). The lower court had
held that Congress implicitly authorized the retroactive application of the cleanup cost
provisions by affirmatively limiting retroactive application of natural resource damages to
natural resources, the most serious public danger. This, in turn, prompted Congress to
enact the entire CERCLA with a general retroactive scheme. In addition, an interpreta-
tion forbidding retroactivity would penalize the government for prompt response, and
would result in an undeserved windfall to those who had created and then abandoned the
most egregious sites. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo.
1985).
294. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 734. The Trial Court had also limited
clean up costs to those costs incurred after the enactment of CERCLA, thereby excluding
costs incurred from April to December, 1980, but the Eighth Circuit rejected this limita-
tion and reversed in part. Id. at 737.,
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have yet to be solved. Our society has not confronted the problem of
assigning the costs of pollution prevention among past, present and fu-
ture generations in an equitable manner, but we do recognize that the
future and the past are tied to the necessity of human action to correct
human errors and failings. President Kennedy expressed this thought
very eloquently a quarter of a century ago:
Our problems are man-made - therefore, they can be solved by man.
And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is
beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the
seemingly unsolvable - and we believe they can do it again.
295
295. President John F. Kennedy, American University Speech, June 10, 1963, re-
printed in Public Papers of the President, Vol. 3, at 232.

